Press Release
Dhaka, 03 September 2026: Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) stated that, despite a few positive amendments proposed by the relevant Standing Committee of the National Parliament in its review of the National Human Rights Commission Bill 2026 and the Enforced Disappearance Prevention and Redress Bill 2026, there are still fundamental deficiencies in the provision of independent, impartial, and free-from-conflicts-of-interest investigations of enforced disappearance and other serious human rights violations. This issue is particularly relevant to the National Human Rights Commission's power to independently investigate allegations against law enforcement agencies suo motu. In light of the bitter experience of prolonged, multidimensional, and brutal human rights violations resulting from the absence of an effective Human Rights Commission and adequate legal and institutional frameworks for preventing enforced disappearance, TIB has called for meaningful parliamentary discussion on every important provision of the two bills, with the participation of all members from both the government and opposition parties, before their final passage.
TIB considers several of the committee's recommendations on the National Human Rights Commission Bill positive, including mandatory representation of indigenous or disadvantaged communities, disqualifying loan defaulters from becoming commissioners, and removing the requirement of prior approval for visiting detention centres other than military detention centres. TIB Executive Director Dr. Iftekharuzzaman said, “The absence of a clear provision that the Commission shall not fall under any ministry or division of the government; the scope for a serving government employee to become a commissioner while on deputation, lien, or unpaid leave; the risk of unchecked influence by the executive—effectively the ruling party—through the presence of the Speaker, two ministers, a ruling-party MP, and the Cabinet Secretary on the selection committee; the deputation of up to 30 percent of the Commission's total staff from government service; and the failure to guarantee full financial independence in the Commission's expenditure and use of allocations—together mean that hopes for a genuinely independent Human Rights Commission remain unfulfilled. In other words, a commission is being formed, but the hope that it will be independent remains an illusion. Similarly, the authority to investigate human rights violations effectively remains in the hands of the accused. It is also concerning that ‘military detention centres’ are absent from the list of places that the National Prevention Mechanism unit may inspect regularly and without prior notice. At the same time, the proposed bill has also narrowed important Commission functions, such as providing legal assistance to an aggrieved person or on their behalf, human rights training, examining the consistency of laws with international human rights instruments, and other work necessary for the advancement of human rights.
On the Enforced Disappearance Prevention and Redress Bill, the parliamentary committee has effectively recommended no fundamental amendment, only a rewording and structural rearrangement of Section 4 to ensure independent investigation, accountability, or victims' rights. TIB described the committee's amendment recommendations on the core framework of accountability as largely "cosmetic." TIB's Executive Director said, “Section 19 of the National Human Rights Commission Bill retains the core arrangement whereby, in cases of serious human rights violations by disciplinary forces, the Commission will seek a report from the concerned force or institution rather than conducting its own direct inquiry and investigation. By narrowing the Commission's power of inquiry and investigation and making it dependent on reports, this provision makes it weaker than even the 2009 law and inconsistent with the Paris Principles. The Enforced Disappearance Prevention Bill suffers from the same problem. While Section 14(3) bars an accused force from investigating its members, it retains the scope to hand responsibility to another disciplinary force or an inter-force investigation team. Yet in the majority of past enforced disappearance cases, there have been specific allegations of involvement by members of various disciplinary, police, intelligence, and security agencies. Is the investigating institution genuinely independent from that same justice-obstructing institutional circle, or is it being asked to investigate itself? A weak or motivated investigation, undermined by conflict of interest and institutional influence, will not only obstruct justice; it could also deprive a victim of enforced disappearance of recognition as a victim, of compensation, and of their family's rights relating to the use and inheritance of property.”
TIB has also pointed to the need for the definition of enforced disappearance to be made more comprehensive, in line with the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED). Dr. Zaman said, “Alongside government employees and members of disciplinary forces, the possible involvement of public representatives, MPs, ministers, advisers, or other influential quarters of the state should also be explicitly included. Similarly, under Section 15, it is unclear how much an accused senior official's exemption from proceedings—based on a subordinate investigator's interim report—would actually be free from influence, which may, in practice, create a risk of blanket impunity for the accused. Furthermore, Section 16 does not keep the 2025 ordinance's safeguards that require the search to continue until the victim of enforced disappearance is found or their fate is confirmed and that require the family to be regularly informed of progress. Compared with the 2025 ordinance, penalties for offences related to enforced disappearance have also been reduced; while the minimum sentence for enforced disappearance remains three years, a maximum of five years' rigorous imprisonment has been set for false or harassing accusations. When the investigation mechanism itself carries the risk of conflict of interest and institutional influence, there is a real concern that, for want of adequate evidence, the failure to prove a genuine allegation could instead be blamed on the complainant's family. Such a provision risks creating a serious culture of fear among victims when it comes to lodging complaints and seeking justice.”
Recalling that TIB had shared its observations on the National Human Rights Commission from the drafting stage and, following Cabinet approval, submitted 25 recommendations on the National Human Rights Commission Bill and 17 recommendations on the Enforced Disappearance Prevention Bill, Dr Zaman said, “The parliamentary committee’s review presented an important opportunity to address the fundamental weaknesses of the two bills. While some positive changes have been made, the core strategic concerns repeatedly raised by stakeholders remain unaddressed. We expect that, instead of being passed hastily by voice vote, the bills will be amended following meaningful discussion in Parliament on every important provision and proposed amendment, with all members rising above partisan loyalty and guided by their moral and humane values. Should the Thirteenth National Parliament fail to ensure that the bills are passed only after the necessary amendments are made to reflect the Paris Principles, ICPPED and other international standards, the grim experiences of the past, victims’ rights, and stakeholders’ specific recommendations, it will be held responsible for failing to meet the people’s expectations for the protection of human rights in the country.”
Media Contact:
Mohammad Tauhidul Islam
Director, Outreach and Communication
Phone: +8801713107868
Email: tauhidul@ti-bangladesh.org
