|
|
 |
|
|
 |
|
Corruption in Bangladesh
An Analytical and Sociological Study
Prepared for
Transparency International - Bangladesh Chapter
By: Almas Zakiuddin
Research Associate: Wahidul Haque
Introduction
This Analytical and Sociological Study of Corruption in Bangladesh seeks to break new ground on a subject which is widely discussed in virtually every area of public and private activity.
Corruption is a topic of interest and concern in academic circles, in the media, among people of different professions, within the civil service, among members of parliament, politicians, government officials, members of the business and financial communities, students, foreign investors, aid agencies and non-governmental organisations. In other words, the term corruption is not new to Bangladesh.
A general impression conveyed by the media and by popular discourse is that among ordinary people in Bangladesh, corruption is viewed quite clearly as 'a way of life'. A recent survey carried out by the Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad reinforces that impression: the survey found, among other significant data, that 95 per cent of respondents believed that the police were the most corrupt department in the land, followed very closely by the customs, the department of excise and taxation, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. A solid 62 per cent of respondents believed that the primary responsibility for corruption in Bangladesh lay in the hands of government officials.
The extent to which corruption has become accepted as 'a way of life' in Bangladesh is challenging in its implications. A recently published feature on corruption in a leading weekend magazine, entitled, 'Corruption of Politics and Politics of Corruption' consisted of a virtual litany of dubious deals, underhand agreements and blatantly corrupt acts by political leaders and parties in Bangladesh, from the infamous regime of H.M Ershad, to the present leadership as well. But surprisingly, both the media report and the research conducted by the Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad, upon which it was partly based, appear to have generated little reaction. Certainly, there were no reports of a public outcry, not even a barrage of letters or telephone calls in response to these successive and extremely challenging expressions of public opinion and media analysis.
Does this mean that the people of Bangladesh are unmoved by the all-pervasive level of corruption in their polity? Or have they become so immune to its horrors, so cynical about what they perceive to be the unhappy reality of their lives, that they have ceased to care? Whatever the reasons, people appear extremely reluctant to believe that anything can be done about corruption.
Perhaps this is one reason for a marked absence of objective, analytical literature on corruption as a social exchange or process. There are, of course, other reasons. But generally speaking, there is a tendency to focus on the enormity of the problem, on the normative aspects of corruption, on the (undoubtedly) negative impact of corruption and indeed, to perpetuate the notion that corruption is its own culprit. The media report mentioned above, for instance, states at the outset that 'Corruption, in our view, lies at the root of the overall degeneration of politics and of a section of our politicians that we see today.' Thus, corruption is seen both as the root and as the effect of a situation, with the result that its salient features are often masked and its behavioural patterns difficult to discern.
Indeed, as far as Bangladesh is concerned, little is known about the manner in which corruption occurs, the process by which, presumably, it grows and flourishes, the conditions which are conducive to its existence and the structures which support its survival. Little is known about corruption as a process, as practice and as structural outcome. It can be said, therefore, that there is inconsequential independent appraisal of corruption as a social phenomenon in this country. Whatever independent or neutral discussion has been generated, tends to focus mainly on the political or economic aspects of corruption. Certainly, very few academic works have been devoted towards obtaining empirically sound, theoretical analyses of the subject from a sociological perspective with special reference to Bangladesh.
This Study will, it is hoped, redress the lack in several ways.
A major aim of this Study has been to seek out works with a sociological perspective of corruption in Bangladesh. As the Study will bear out, the search has been disappointing in the sense that only a few works of specific relevance have been found. Consequently, the challenge has been to identify and analyse the literature available, from a sociological perspective. Many works on the political or economic aspects of Bangladesh do contain data on social issues in general and corruption in particular and hence, such works have been included as sources on corruption. It is hoped that this Study will form the basis for further research on the subject.
The Study is arranged in three parts:
- Paper II is a Literature Review which summarises the broad trends which have emerged from some 38 works which have been reviewed.
Paper I
Critical Analysis of the Sociology of Corruption
Reality of Corruption
The Annotated Bibliography in this Study establishes the reality of corruption as a social phenomenon in Bangladesh. In some 38 works selected and reviewed, only a few deal with corruption in a general and global context. All the remaining works in the selection, either implicitly or explicitly, provide ample evidence that corruption exists as a process, usually as a form of social, economic or political exchange, often in an institutionalised form, in the socio-economic and political life of Bangladesh. It reaches far, wide and deep: from the senior bureaucracy in the capital city, to the far-flung corners of the country, from the apex of political activity to the minute activities of a rural community.
Corruption is not just an economic exchange, generated by a monetary or 'economic' motive. Neither is corruption an exclusively political activity, motivated by a desire to attain or retain political power. The process of corruption is more than economic or political - it is a social process as well, existing side-by-side with, and sometimes complementing economic and political activity.
As a social process, therefore, corruption is everywhere in Bangladesh. It is present, for instance, in the process of political patronage, and/or the socio-political institutional arrangement called a patron-client relationship, through which public resources are appropriated by a select group of people, usually described as elites; it is visible in economic exchanges such as the process of rent-seeking which (regulatory requirements by) public servants impose on players in the market: also known as ghoosh or bribe; it is visible and invisible in a host of activities which range from outright bribery to more subtle forms of patronage or persuasion such as tadbir, from underhand deals involving vast sums of money at the national and international levels, to petty, everyday baksheesh which the doorman at a bureaucrat's office extracts in order to perform his normal duties.
Yet, as the Annotated Bibliography will also disclose, there is very little objective analysis to explain why and how there is corruption in Bangladesh. This is not because there are no reasons attributed for corruption. On the contrary, a majority of works either directly or indirectly attribute several causes and advance various theories for the existence and survival of corruption. But attempts to understand the fundamental social processes which are related to corruption are notably absent
For instance, the dichotomy of 'good' versus 'evil' is a popular theme in many works - both in those few works (mainly articles and reports) which specifically address the issue of corruption in Bangladesh, as well as in a large number of books, journal articles and reports, which make references to corruption, while examining other issues such as socio-economic or political events, poverty or development in Bangladesh. In these works, corruption frequently features as a vice, caused by human failings such as greed, avarice, selfishness, self-interest, callousness, and consequently, its eradication is seen to require actions which are virtuous, such as nobility, patriotism, dedication, honesty, integrity, zeal, and so on.
Some works rely on 'modernisation' theory as their basis, implying that countries like Bangladesh have not progressed from a 'primitive' to a 'modern' state of polity and hence are still showing signs of 'traditional' forms of organisation, among which corruption features prominently. At the same time, a number of authors blame capitalism and the quest for 'modernity' as the root causes of corruption. Many blame politicians, bureaucrats, the state apparatus, regulatory policies, political upheaval, tradition, culture and western influences for the prevailing 'high' level of corruption in Bangladesh. Indeed, although corruption as social process is difficult - some would say impossible - to measure, many works allude to 'more' or 'increasing' levels of corruption in this country.
In other words, while theories abound, only a few works are dedicated to studying corruption as a process, removed from its normative implications. As a reading of the Annotated Bibliography will confirm, by far and large, wherever the issue of corruption is discussed - either in passing or as part of a dedicated section within a work - it is invariably dominated by its normative impact - as an immoral act or process which has a negative effect and is thus socially reprehensible.
Which is not to suggest that corruption is in any way socially or otherwise desirable, but only to make the point that there is a notable absence of research on corruption from an objective, and sociological point of view.
Sociological Perspective
It might be asked, what is a sociological point of view? Sociology is the study of the development, nature and laws of human society. Society, in turn, is a term which describes a mode of life, and includes a range of interests and activities, such as process, organisation, structure, human behaviour, human relationships, customs, and forms. The term 'sociological', therefore, can be fairly widely applied.
To provide an understanding of corruption from a sociological perspective, it would be necessary to examine, explore and critically analyse corruption as a process of social formation, encompassing corruption in the real world of social structures, institutions and modes of exchange, and at the same time, to also locate and reconcile the reality within an analytical framework which would critically explore the discourse on corruption.
This Study aims to approach the subject of corruption in Bangladesh from the sociological perspective by critically examining a selection of literature on the subject, and by seeking through this examination to explore the fundamental processes of the social formation of corruption in Bangladesh - both as a reality, as well as expressed in the literature selected on the subject.
Sociological interpretations must take into account social, political and economic forces, both as societal conditions, as well as rhetorical and historical influences which inform the discourse on corruption. It is also important to move beyond dichotomous, normative conclusions and focus instead on corruption as an exchange, as well as behaviour, process and outcome. Consequently, the challenge in exploring corruption from this perspective lies essentially in being able to critically focus on the subject of corruption as it exists in Bangladesh, together with the conceptual demands of the dominant discourse on the subject.
As will be discussed in some detail in this Study, many of the works under review are informed - either implicitly or explicitly - by an ethnocentric, modernising ideology, which is not necessarily applicable to the reality of conditions in developing societies like Bangladesh. The significance of these influences is enormous because they reflect the dominant discourse on corruption - especially as an issue of development -- in no uncertain terms.
Corruption as behaviour, process or activity, is impossible to quantify. Consequently, for social scientists the functional argument which focuses on the 'positive' aspects of corruption necessarily provides only a means of understanding process. Thus, while it might be argued that corruption functions as a useful mechanism to aid social, political or economic exchange, the relevance to social science lies in the process as activity, without reference to its normative qualities. Consequently, while this Study adopts many 'functional' arguments, it does so in a non-judgemental way, the aim being to further the understanding of the process by which corruption takes place in a given situation.
Eliminating Corruption
The ultimate aim of this Study, and presumably of all similar research, is to eliminate corruption in Bangladesh. The question is, how can this be achieved? A popular notion, reflected to some extent in the Annotated Bibliography, is to simply stamp out corruption. There is no doubt about the need to end corruption, but it is worth asking if the solution is to simply mount an attack on corruption or indeed, as is also often suggested, on its root cause. Apart from the fact that there are different points of view on exactly what constitutes the root cause of corruption, it is also moot to consider that repeated attempts to do so have not met with success. By all accounts, Bangladesh is still - perhaps more so now, than ever before - a corrupt polity, society and economy.
It is concluded in this Study that part of the solution to corruption lies in posing questions which address the fundamental social concepts of corruption as a prerequisite of all research and especially of any sociological research on the subject, thus encouraging a more searching and comprehensive 'assault' on the culprit. In other words, before devising programmes to eliminate corruption we must know a great deal more about its nature, characteristics and patterns.
It is further concluded that a study of corruption must be more than a piece of evaluation which examines a set of conditions within a predetermined framework. Too often, developing societies have been subjected to these types of appraisal and, predictably, have been found wanting. When society is assessed within a pre-determined framework which is alien to the problems of the real (Bangladeshi) world, wherein corruption exists as an institutionalised mechanism of exchange under specific socio-economic conditions, the existence of any differences tend to be dismissed as departures from the norm, or negatively assessed, or even completely misunderstood.
This Study finds a considerable number of works on corruption or related topics to be influenced by predetermined influences. A key conclusion reached by this analysis therefore, is that there is a need to assimilate an objective outline of appraisal before undertaking any research on corruption and/or initiating measures to eliminate it.
Defining Corruption
Corruption is not identifiable as a single, separate, independent entity which can be isolated and destroyed. Corruption is a complex set of processes involving human behaviour and many other variables, some of which are difficult to recognise or measure. Even though corruption manifests itself as a force on its own and often generates its own momentum, it is linked to many other factors, and it is by understanding these factors that we can hope to understand corruption.
Understanding corruption is therefore the first step in eradicating or, at least, containing corruption. In order to understand corruption, we have to first define it.
There are several meanings of the word corruption but when we use the term, we usually refer to a specific kind of exchange, activity or behaviour. For instance, corruption could mean a process of physical decay or degeneration; the loss of innocence; a state of moral impurity or moral deterioration; perversion in taste or language; and also the wrongful, negligent or wilfully corrupt act of a public official in the discharge of his or her public duties.
It is this last meaning of corruption, as the destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties (Theobald, 1990) which features most often in our language. Defined also as 'the misuse of public power for private profit', it is this specific definition of corruption which dominates our interpretation of the term.
Therefore, when we discuss corruption in Bangladesh, we are referring to the exchange, activity, process or behaviour which occurs when the public domain comes into contact with the private domain. From this definition, it is obvious that corruption carries within it several assumptions - of a 'public' as opposed to a 'private' domain; an official code of behaviour as opposed to an unofficial code of behaviour; the existence of a public or state apparatus; and even the existence of a particular kind of social, economic and political organisation (within which the public and private can operate smoothly).
These assumptions, embodied in the popular meaning of corruption, are significant because definitions aside, when it comes to dealing with corruption - at the political, economic and certainly, at the sociological level - it is often difficult to decide exactly what constitutes corruption.
For example, a question which is frequently posed is whether corruption is an age-old practice or a relatively new innovation. In the specific definition which we use most commonly both in our lexicon and in this Study, corruption can only apply to a situation in which there is a clear and specific demarcation between the 'public' and the 'private'. In 'pre-modern' times, when political organisation was based on kingship, there was no clear demarcation between the ruler's public and private duties, rights or responsibilities. Yet, there is evidence that corruption did exist in 'pre-modern' times (Theobald, 1990 p. 41- 45 and passim). So was the corruption of an earlier era a different kind of corruption, and if so, what made it different? How can we distinguish between the older and newer versions of corruption?
In answer to these questions it may be said that yes, what constituted corruption in an earlier era was different from what constitutes corruption now in the sense that the present notion of corruption - as the 'misuse of public office for private profit' - has emerged as a result of a particular historical context and socio-economic circumstances. This historically specific notion is discussed in some detail below, but what can be stated here is that corruption as we define it now can be distinguished from the older variety, so to speak, mainly because it rests on the fundamental assumption that the world is divided into distinct, 'public' and 'private' spheres of influence.
In fact, it must be noted that in our quest to understand corruption, it is this very assumption which presents the most obvious challenge because, as we will discuss below, the question of what is 'public' and what is 'private' is open to much interpretation.
At this stage, it can be summarised that while we do have a specific meaning of corruption as a starting point for our discussion, what constitutes corruption within the parameters of the specific definition depends on a number of variables. Consequently, the specific definition which we use is itself problematic and subject to debate.
Applying the Definition
Definitions of corruption are important for two main reasons. First, because the options which offer themselves indicate to a great extent the varied and often over-lapping meanings of corruption and the consequent difficulties in finding compact explanations for the term. Second, because when it comes to application, corruption as we have defined it, is problematic.
While it can be said that corruption usually describes an activity of the public and the private sectors, or of the state in relation to the market, exactly what constitutes corruption is the subject of some debate. If corruption refers to the (illegal) diversion of public resources into unauthorised private use, does it refer only to the corrupt behaviour of officials or to those private individuals who interact with officials? In this sense, therefore, is corruption about the state or about the market? In terms of social exchange, there seems to be little difference between the way a public official or a private individual behave; or between interactions between people and the state and the interactions between people in markets. In fact, it might even be argued that instead of becoming the formal regulator of an immoral market, the state, too, is immoral in the sense that it takes on the functions of allocation in an imperfect market. Can the actions of the state, as a player in the marketplace, therefore be seen as corrupt in a sociological sense? (Wood, 1994)
Furthermore, how do we resolve questions of motive and power in these relationships, for if the private individuals are seeking to secure what is theirs by right, but which is only made available to them if they enter into informal transactions with officials who control these rights, does that constitute corruption? The example of a repressive regime, where officials may have to be bribed in order to prevent torture or death, illustrates one of the varied ways in which the application of a specific meaning of corruption might pose a serious dilemma (Theobald, 1990).
Corruption describes behaviour which is usually unacceptable to society, consequently there are criminal and legal sides to this definition as well. But when it comes to the actual application of official responsibility or actions, especially on a day-to-day basis, legal definitions are not always enough - indeed, under the guise of regulations, they may even create a rigid bureaucracy which becomes inefficient and eventually requires 'speed-money' or other forms of graft to make it work (Guhan and Paul, 1997). Indeed as one analyst has noted, there is only one thing worse than a 'rigid, over-centralised dishonest bureaucracy' and that is, a 'rigid, over-centralised honest bureaucracy'. In a perverse sort of way, therefore, corruption can therefore actually enable the public sector (and the economy) to function.
The problematic in the 'public office for private profit' definition lies in the reality that for public officials to efficiently discharge their duties, they require some degree of flexibility and yet, their office is also open to abuse. It is difficult to decide, therefore, exactly which act of public office can be termed 'discretionary' and which 'corrupt'.
For instance, as one interesting work in the Annotated Bibliography points out, for a public servant in Bangladesh, what is the difference between coming habitually late to work, receiving gifts, keeping people in power 'in good humour', or committing a corrupt act entirely because of pressure from a 'controlling forum'? (Hussain, 1990) The author of this work, entitled Corruption in Public Offices: Some Conceptual Issues in the Context of Bangladesh, analyses responses to questions like these which are part of a questionnaire circulated to public officials in Bangladesh. The responses collated by him indicate that under certain circumstances, a public servant has to be 'corrupt' but a majority does not regard this to be corruption: it all depends on the circumstances. Consequently, while it can be said that there are degrees of corruption, from the subtle practice of keeping powerful people happy, to the outright act of receiving a bribe, it is also worth noting that ambiguities remain and it is difficult to decide which would be considered 'more' corrupt - the misappropriation of public funds for the purchase of private luxuries, or the use of influence by a public official to obtain a particularly lucrative job for a kin or a client.
Needless to say, these questions are difficult, even impossible to answer with complete certainty. Which is why other suggestions are put forward. For instance, some people suggest that corruption should be defined as an act which goes against the 'public interest'. But there is debate over what constitutes the 'public interest'. A similar suggestion with regard to 'public opinion' as a criterion for identifying corruption is also problematic because, among other reasons, public opinion can vary from time to time and from place to place. And, as has been already stated, a legal definition is also not without drawbacks for it would imply a demarcation of potentially rigid boundaries which would preclude consideration of the more subtle forms of corruption, for instance, nepotism.
Impact of Corruption
A significant consideration in this discussion must be the impact of corruption and with it, the moral impact of corrupt acts, especially when committed by the state. Although there is considerable debate about the causes of corruption, and also about the manner in which corruption manifests itself, there can be no denying the negative impact of corruption. True, there are arguments which claim that, under certain circumstances, corruption can be beneficial in oiling the wheels of a rigid, over-regulated economy, in providing a safety-valve from repressive regimes, in overcoming delays caused by administrative hurdles and even in personalising what would otherwise have been an impersonal and uncaring distribution system. (Theobald, 1990; Guhan and Paul, 1997) Examples of graft in the former Soviet Union, and the patronage system in the cities of the United States which originated in the 1830s, are often used to illustrate the instrumental advantages of corruption (Theobald, 1990).
Similarly, it is argued that in the developing world, corruption is a form of indirect taxation which, if removed, would cause bottlenecks which would prevent the smooth functioning of government and business (Consumark Limited, undated, Paper I, p. 17). Furthermore, analysts argue against the assertion that corruption is a waste of resources. They point out the fallacy in the assumption that resources 'diverted' into graft would otherwise have been spent productively, or redistributed to the poor, claiming that resources 'saved' from graft would most likely be spent on luxury items, not on development projects. In other words, in a situation of chronic scarcity which is what exists in the developing world, there would be other ways in which income inequities would be maintained.
It is true that under certain circumstances, corruption can provide some instrumental advantages. It is possible that without corruption, administration in many parts of the developing world would - at least temporarily - be impeded. It is also undoubtedly true that under certain conditions, corruption lends a humanising aspect to what may otherwise have been an impersonal and rigid exchange. In economic terms there is no difference between illicit and licit goods indeed, as an economic exchange, corruption often stabilises the business environment, functioning as an important medium through which the logic of the market asserts itself. Examples abound, a well-known one being the case of Brazil where a class of brokers called despachante had emerged entirely to act as intermediaries in a bureaucratic maze which evidently was so complex that in one celebrated case, it required 1470 separate legal actions, 13 government ministries and 50 agencies to obtain a single export license (Theobald, 1990, p. 157 ).
Arguments in support of corruption can be applied to many developing societies, where a large bureaucracy is usually so extended and inefficient, that business and trade can only function with the aid of consistent corruption. In Bangladesh, certainly, although corruption is seen to be a serious problem, it is also evident that corruption has its uses. Two works in particular convey the distinct impression that without corruption, business would be paralysed (Consumark, undated; Quddus, in Ali, et al, 1996). As these studies explain, the plethora of bureaucratic rules and regulations in the country is such that entrepreneurs like an ordinary rickshaw malik (owner) or a garment exporter can survive only by being corrupt.
But do these instances imply that we might regard corruption as being beneficial in any way?
Granted, that in the absence of exchanges which make the bureaucracy 'flexible', much activity in Bangladesh would come to a halt. But surely the illicit exchange, or the bribe, itself, is not the problem. It is extremely important to realise that the 'benefits' of corruption are, in all likelihood, masking symptoms of a seriously dysfunctional socio-economic or political system. It is more than likely that corruption has emerged because of other, hidden or deep-seated problems or, as is often the case in the developing world, corruption flourishes because structures have been imposed on people without due consideration of their applicability in these environments.
Whatever the circumstances or the historical reasons, there is no getting away from the fact that the impact of corruption is negative. Furthermore, although corruption in any form is undesirable, it appears to be considerably less acceptable when the state is corrupt. This is partly because the state presumes upon the membership and loyalty of its citizens - something which a private body does not (cannot) assume. Consequently, because the state has a special position, and is regarded to be a neutral, impartial, and representative body which will provide for and protect the rights of the people, any perversion of this understanding is regarded to be far more serious than if the same act were carried out by a private body.
In fact, the behaviour of the state is important for other reasons as well. To borrow from another discussion, the behaviour of the state is significant because the market cannot be depended upon to be caring - indeed, it is not meant to be a caring organ. As Amartya Sen explains in a discussion on the behaviour of the market during the Irish famine in the 1840s, the reason the market continued to export potatoes to Britain from Ireland during the famine was because the market was not concerned with relative needs - only with relative demand. (Sen, in Abdullah and Khan, (eds) 1996). In Sen's words, the market is an 'organ of alienation' which is neither friendly, nor hostile, simply unconcerned about anything save comparative purchasing powers. (ibid., p. 23, 21). In other words, the market does not care if people starve in a famine or eat in a famine. This does not mean that the market is an evil institution, but it implies that someone has to care, especially if the market does not. And that is why the state, in addition to being the only institution which, under given circumstances, can be expected to be moral, also becomes the repository of much human aspiration. This is one reason why, when the state is corrupt, it undermines the moral fabric of society.
A pertinent objection to corruption is the reality that it is virtually impossible to confine corruption to those areas, for instance, where its effects are deemed to be desirable. (Theobald, 1990). Consequently, it is safe to conclude as the World Bank did some 15 years ago, that corruption weakens the effectiveness of governments, undermines popular confidence in the public service, and leads to a situation where public servants will do nothing without bribes. The purchase of favours is nothing but an unproductive exercise. Corruption enables the wealthy, the powerful and the unscrupulous, at the expense of law-abiding citizens of a country. (Theobald, 1990)
In other words, the general consensus seems to be that although corruption may have some instrumental advantages, it is undesirable in the balance and should be controlled, as far as possible. It may therefore be summarised that even though the definition of corruption as an activity which applies to the misuse of public office continues to have limitations, in the absence of a more acceptable definition, and because the dominant socio-economic and political model of our time is premised on a demarcation of the 'public' and the 'private' spheres within a modern nation-state which the popular definition reflects, it is this definition which continues to provide the basis for discussions on corruption.
As we have already noted, the dichotomy of 'public' and 'private' continues to be problematic. How and why this is so can best be explained by examining the historical basis of this definition.
The Rational-Legal Paradigm
At the core of the 'public power for private profit' definition lies the assumption that there are two discrete private and public worlds, separated by clearly demarcated boundaries. This definition is the product of a historically specific, and ideologically biased paradigm. An integral component of this paradigm is the ideal of the 'rational-legal bureaucracy', a term defined by Max Weber and adopted by the developed, as the dominant model of public service and state-craft (Theobald, 1990). The Weberian ideal envisages a hierarchical organisation of public servants chosen according to merit, who are paid a regular salary according to rank, and who are guided through clearly outlined rules and regulations, to make decisions based on objective, universalistic criteria, all the while remembering to scrupulously segregate public affairs from private interests (Ibid.).
While the model itself began somewhat incidentally, accompanying the emergence of the nation-state in nineteenth century Europe, it was, like the concept of the new nation-state, shaped by major political and social changes of its time. It is worth noting that as a consequence of these changes the state was redefined as the 'harbinger and main instrument of social change', as well as the 'trigger for and protector of the modern institutions associated with industrial capitalism.' (Nandy, in Sachs, 1992, p. 264 - 274) In one way or another, this European notion of the nation-state, together with the structure and processes of capitalist industrialisation, organised under the rubric of 'liberal-democracy' have informed subsequent political development in the third world. The rational-legal model of bureaucracy has been an integral part of this influence.
Problem with the Paradigm
The problem with the rational-legal paradigm is, however, three-fold. First, as a theoretical concept, it is problematic to blur ideal and reality, or concept and evidence. In other words, the application of a Weberian ideal which lies outside the reality of the social structure of Bangladesh, weakens any analysis because, "the comparison is being made between reality and rhetoric respectively, or between actual behavioural patterns on the one hand and ideal-type propositions on the other." (Wood, 1994 p. 533). In the rational-legal paradigm, the existence of a patron-client based organisation, and a multi-transactional culture, and their respective interactions with the state can only be interpreted as a subversion of the principle of bureaucratic rationality (Wood,1994 ). In this paradigm there can be no reconciliation between evidence and concept, or theory and practice (Ibid.).
The second problem with this paradigm is that, inasmuch as the bureaucratic structures of the developed world might be seen to approximate the rational-legal model, it is debatable whether the Weberian ideal, or a particular cultural ethic, or indeed, the influence of western liberal thought, can be held responsible for the establishment of this structure. Indeed, it can be argued that although there were far-reaching behavioural changes in Europe in the nineteenth century which ushered in the era defined as 'modern', these changes were not, as is often assumed, an emerging social work ethic inspired by protestantism and the cultural values which were informed by it, but rather the result of a "dramatic economic expansion" (Theobald, 1990, p. 151).
It was capitalistic industrialisation and the changes wrought from this innovation which allowed the fruits of the economic expansion to be enjoyed eventually by the masses - changes such as institutional growth, mass awareness, democratic and accountable norms of political and social organisation. For the social scientist it is worth noting that it was the "development of public accountability and awareness of its necessity, rather than some alleged diffusion of greater honesty" in the developed world that eventually defined notions of public and political corruption (Ibid., p. 152).
In fact, the sometimes violent intervention of the state in the market was also a major factor in the development of the national economy, an activity which is often subsumed under the theory that market forces emerged on the European landscape, in spite of the so-called limitations of the state. (Polanyi, 1944). The part played by the industrial revolution and the state in the 'emancipation' of the market in the developed world is crucial to an analysis of the future of the state in general and in the developing world in particular. At the same time, it must be taken into account that the 'bureaucratic principle', as embodied in the notion of a corruption-free public service in the developed world is based on a historically specific paradigm (Theobald, 1990, p. 3).
Which leads us to the third problem with the paradigm and this is that, in any case, the assumption that the developed world has managed to replicate the institution of a rational-legal bureaucracy which conforms perfectly to the Weberian ideal is an extremely debatable, some would say mythical notion. Public administration cannot function without some degree of 'flexibility' and therefore, reality in the developed world is quite different from the idealised role model. To sum it up:
....no institutional apparatus can cohere on the basis of rational-legal principles alone. The state apparatus is necessarily pervaded by personal exchanges expressed through networks which embody some combination of ideal and material interests and along which flow resources such as friendship, various forms of support, information, material inducements and suchlike. In no organisational context is it possible to maintain a permanent and impenetrable division between public resources and private interests. In other words, patrimonialism is both normal and necessary at all levels of public (and private) bureaucracies... (Theobald, 1990 p. 131 - 132)
Does this mean, therefore, that under certain circumstances, corruption is normal? The difficulty in answering this question with any degree of certainty illustrates the problematic just discussed. It can be argued, however, that corruption appears easier to 'absorb' or accept as normal, under certain conditions and circumstances. Why this should be so depends on a range of factors, some of which are discussed below.
A Question of Perception
As far as the developed world is concerned, there is ample evidence of corruption in the public sector, involving the state apparatus and politicians, in petty as well as in comparatively more lucrative illicit exchanges. And yet, there is a distinct impression that the countries of the developed world boast of a more or less 'clean' bureaucracy and even, with a few notable exceptions, of a corruption-free polity. The observation of Gunnar Myrdal in the influential work, Asian Drama, in 1968, illustrates a commonly held view. Discussing corruption in the developing world, he observed: "Concerning the general level of corruption it is unquestionably much higher than in Western countries, (even including the US) or in the Communist countries." The reasons for this impression are worth examining because they point to a fundamental bias in perspective which, in turn, has an effect on how we understand corruption.
A primary factor to consider is perception. A recent poll by Transparency International (TI) of how business communities in some 47 countries around the world perceive corruption is extremely interesting. In this poll, businessmen working for multinationals companies and institutions were asked to rank countries according to the level of corruption and its impact on commercial and social life. In the TI Corruption Perception Index for 1997 which emerged as a result of this poll, Nigeria came out as the most corrupt country among 52 economies under scrutiny, and Denmark as the least corrupt. Among the most corrupt countries, there were far more countries from the developing world than from the developed - an aspect which was fairly publicised by the media. There was some adverse reaction to this Index, the criticism being that the businessmen polled were mainly from the developed world and hence, biased in their attitudes.
The stated intention of the poll, as TI chairman Peter Eigen explained, was not to indicate the level of corruption in any country, but to present an assessment of the perception about corruption. To that end, this poll is faithful. It clearly demonstrates that business, particularly in developed countries views corruption as being higher in the developing world.
An interesting point is how corruption in the developing countries is linked to actions by, and activities in the developed countries. Measurements aside, as the chairman of TI again states, "a large share of the corruption (in developing countries) is also the product of multinational corporations, head-quartered in leading industrial countries, using bribery and kick-backs to buy contracts in the developing world and the countries in transition." It is worth noting that in spite of the links between foreign investment and corruption in the developing world, the perception remains that it is the developing world which is 'more' corrupt.
Measuring Corruption
Which leads us to a fundamental question and that is whether we can measure corruption with any degree of accuracy. If so, is there a way of deciding which countries are 'more' and which are 'less' corrupt than others?
The literature on corruption in Bangladesh contains innumerable references to measurements of corruption, the authors implying with reference to different situations that there are greater, more insidious, more pervasive, and more blatant instances of corruption now than have existed before. The problem is, there is no way of knowing for sure if at all, and to what extent, the authors are accurate. One way of finding our about the level of corruption in a given society could be by monitoring the media, and other public forum. But these signposts can be extremely misleading. If anything, corruption may acquire bigger proportions in certain situations, for instance under a repressive regime, but continue to remain 'hidden' from public view. And conversely, in situations where there is greater public discussion of corruption it does not follow that there is 'more' corruption, because where the media is free, there is likely to be more discussion of a subject - and also, more accountability. In other words, media or other public methods of gauging the 'size' of corruption are not reliable.
In economic and development terms, corruption can be quantified by placing a monetary value against a corrupt act. And so, for instance, the 'cost' of paying bribes in the running of a garment industry can be calculated (Quddus, in Ali, et al 1996) or, a similar calculation can be made with reference to rickshaw owners and entrepreneurs (Consumark, undated). It can also be shown how, for instance in the agricultural credit market in Bangladesh, the effective interest rate from a formal credit source (which includes a bribe), and the informal interest rate from an informal source, are eventually equal in equilibrium, the point being that market forces will encourage price adjustments in order to incorporate the opportunity cost of a service or product (Gupta and Chaudhuri, 1997). The formal 'cost' of credit to the borrower can therefore be calculated as being the same as the informal cost, even if the formal interest rate is lower than the informal rate. (Ibid.)
But by far and large, calculations of the 'cost' of corruption are misleading. As Geoffrey Wood argues, in monopoly conditions, when the only option for a consumer of public resources is to accept the terms of the monopolist, or accept total exit, the consumer will continue to pay the bribe demanded for a product because total exit is not an option (Wood, 1994). It is much the same situation as the members of a society decrying the level of corruption within that society but being able to do nothing about it because the only option is to refuse to live in that society. In such circumstances, there is no option, and hence, the 'cost' of corruption is infinite.
Consequently, it can be asserted that the so-called cost of corruption cannot be relied upon as a guide to understanding corruption, because although corruption as an economic exchange can be quantified under certain conditions, this is no indication of its real value. The point which must be made is that corruption is more than an economic exchange. Certainly, there is no calculation which can account precisely for the social impact of corruption. There is no foolproof way of measuring the loss entailed by corruption in a social and psychological sense - just as there is no way of calculating the social 'advantages' which might accrue from corruption.
Although measurements of corruption are unreliable and imprecise, there is a general impression that some parts of the world are 'more' corrupt than others. Indeed, as stated earlier, there is a general impression that the developed world is less corrupt that the developing world. Certainly, contemporary perceptions seem to be inclined in this direction. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for 1997, quoted in the previous section, demonstrates that among the 52 countries assessed in the poll, the top 30 countries are predominantly from the developed world. The notable exceptions are, Singapore (9th), Hong Kong (18th), Costa Rica (22nd), Chile (23rd). In the bottom, i.e. 'more' corrupt, section of this Index, there are no countries from the developed world. |
|
|
|
|
Corruption in Bangladesh
An Analytical and Sociological Study
Prepared for
Transparency International - Bangladesh Chapter
By: Almas Zakiuddin
Research Associate: Wahidul Haque
Introduction
This Analytical and Sociological Study of Corruption in Bangladesh seeks to break new ground on a subject which is widely discussed in virtually every area of public and private activity.
Corruption is a topic of interest and concern in academic circles, in the media, among people of different professions, within the civil service, among members of parliament, politicians, government officials, members of the business and financial communities, students, foreign investors, aid agencies and non-governmental organisations. In other words, the term corruption is not new to Bangladesh.
A general impression conveyed by the media and by popular discourse is that among ordinary people in Bangladesh, corruption is viewed quite clearly as 'a way of life'. A recent survey carried out by the Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad reinforces that impression: the survey found, among other significant data, that 95 per cent of respondents believed that the police were the most corrupt department in the land, followed very closely by the customs, the department of excise and taxation, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. A solid 62 per cent of respondents believed that the primary responsibility for corruption in Bangladesh lay in the hands of government officials.
The extent to which corruption has become accepted as 'a way of life' in Bangladesh is challenging in its implications. A recently published feature on corruption in a leading weekend magazine, entitled, 'Corruption of Politics and Politics of Corruption' consisted of a virtual litany of dubious deals, underhand agreements and blatantly corrupt acts by political leaders and parties in Bangladesh, from the infamous regime of H.M Ershad, to the present leadership as well. But surprisingly, both the media report and the research conducted by the Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad, upon which it was partly based, appear to have generated little reaction. Certainly, there were no reports of a public outcry, not even a barrage of letters or telephone calls in response to these successive and extremely challenging expressions of public opinion and media analysis.
Does this mean that the people of Bangladesh are unmoved by the all-pervasive level of corruption in their polity? Or have they become so immune to its horrors, so cynical about what they perceive to be the unhappy reality of their lives, that they have ceased to care? Whatever the reasons, people appear extremely reluctant to believe that anything can be done about corruption.
Perhaps this is one reason for a marked absence of objective, analytical literature on corruption as a social exchange or process. There are, of course, other reasons. But generally speaking, there is a tendency to focus on the enormity of the problem, on the normative aspects of corruption, on the (undoubtedly) negative impact of corruption and indeed, to perpetuate the notion that corruption is its own culprit. The media report mentioned above, for instance, states at the outset that 'Corruption, in our view, lies at the root of the overall degeneration of politics and of a section of our politicians that we see today.' Thus, corruption is seen both as the root and as the effect of a situation, with the result that its salient features are often masked and its behavioural patterns difficult to discern.
Indeed, as far as Bangladesh is concerned, little is known about the manner in which corruption occurs, the process by which, presumably, it grows and flourishes, the conditions which are conducive to its existence and the structures which support its survival. Little is known about corruption as a process, as practice and as structural outcome. It can be said, therefore, that there is inconsequential independent appraisal of corruption as a social phenomenon in this country. Whatever independent or neutral discussion has been generated, tends to focus mainly on the political or economic aspects of corruption. Certainly, very few academic works have been devoted towards obtaining empirically sound, theoretical analyses of the subject from a sociological perspective with special reference to Bangladesh.
This Study will, it is hoped, redress the lack in several ways.
A major aim of this Study has been to seek out works with a sociological perspective of corruption in Bangladesh. As the Study will bear out, the search has been disappointing in the sense that only a few works of specific relevance have been found. Consequently, the challenge has been to identify and analyse the literature available, from a sociological perspective. Many works on the political or economic aspects of Bangladesh do contain data on social issues in general and corruption in particular and hence, such works have been included as sources on corruption. It is hoped that this Study will form the basis for further research on the subject.
The Study is arranged in three parts:
- Paper II is a Literature Review which summarises the broad trends which have emerged from some 38 works which have been reviewed.
Paper I
Critical Analysis of the Sociology of Corruption
Reality of Corruption
The Annotated Bibliography in this Study establishes the reality of corruption as a social phenomenon in Bangladesh. In some 38 works selected and reviewed, only a few deal with corruption in a general and global context. All the remaining works in the selection, either implicitly or explicitly, provide ample evidence that corruption exists as a process, usually as a form of social, economic or political exchange, often in an institutionalised form, in the socio-economic and political life of Bangladesh. It reaches far, wide and deep: from the senior bureaucracy in the capital city, to the far-flung corners of the country, from the apex of political activity to the minute activities of a rural community.
Corruption is not just an economic exchange, generated by a monetary or 'economic' motive. Neither is corruption an exclusively political activity, motivated by a desire to attain or retain political power. The process of corruption is more than economic or political - it is a social process as well, existing side-by-side with, and sometimes complementing economic and political activity.
As a social process, therefore, corruption is everywhere in Bangladesh. It is present, for instance, in the process of political patronage, and/or the socio-political institutional arrangement called a patron-client relationship, through which public resources are appropriated by a select group of people, usually described as elites; it is visible in economic exchanges such as the process of rent-seeking which (regulatory requirements by) public servants impose on players in the market: also known as ghoosh or bribe; it is visible and invisible in a host of activities which range from outright bribery to more subtle forms of patronage or persuasion such as tadbir, from underhand deals involving vast sums of money at the national and international levels, to petty, everyday baksheesh which the doorman at a bureaucrat's office extracts in order to perform his normal duties.
Yet, as the Annotated Bibliography will also disclose, there is very little objective analysis to explain why and how there is corruption in Bangladesh. This is not because there are no reasons attributed for corruption. On the contrary, a majority of works either directly or indirectly attribute several causes and advance various theories for the existence and survival of corruption. But attempts to understand the fundamental social processes which are related to corruption are notably absent
For instance, the dichotomy of 'good' versus 'evil' is a popular theme in many works - both in those few works (mainly articles and reports) which specifically address the issue of corruption in Bangladesh, as well as in a large number of books, journal articles and reports, which make references to corruption, while examining other issues such as socio-economic or political events, poverty or development in Bangladesh. In these works, corruption frequently features as a vice, caused by human failings such as greed, avarice, selfishness, self-interest, callousness, and consequently, its eradication is seen to require actions which are virtuous, such as nobility, patriotism, dedication, honesty, integrity, zeal, and so on.
Some works rely on 'modernisation' theory as their basis, implying that countries like Bangladesh have not progressed from a 'primitive' to a 'modern' state of polity and hence are still showing signs of 'traditional' forms of organisation, among which corruption features prominently. At the same time, a number of authors blame capitalism and the quest for 'modernity' as the root causes of corruption. Many blame politicians, bureaucrats, the state apparatus, regulatory policies, political upheaval, tradition, culture and western influences for the prevailing 'high' level of corruption in Bangladesh. Indeed, although corruption as social process is difficult - some would say impossible - to measure, many works allude to 'more' or 'increasing' levels of corruption in this country.
In other words, while theories abound, only a few works are dedicated to studying corruption as a process, removed from its normative implications. As a reading of the Annotated Bibliography will confirm, by far and large, wherever the issue of corruption is discussed - either in passing or as part of a dedicated section within a work - it is invariably dominated by its normative impact - as an immoral act or process which has a negative effect and is thus socially reprehensible.
Which is not to suggest that corruption is in any way socially or otherwise desirable, but only to make the point that there is a notable absence of research on corruption from an objective, and sociological point of view.
Sociological Perspective
It might be asked, what is a sociological point of view? Sociology is the study of the development, nature and laws of human society. Society, in turn, is a term which describes a mode of life, and includes a range of interests and activities, such as process, organisation, structure, human behaviour, human relationships, customs, and forms. The term 'sociological', therefore, can be fairly widely applied.
To provide an understanding of corruption from a sociological perspective, it would be necessary to examine, explore and critically analyse corruption as a process of social formation, encompassing corruption in the real world of social structures, institutions and modes of exchange, and at the same time, to also locate and reconcile the reality within an analytical framework which would critically explore the discourse on corruption.
This Study aims to approach the subject of corruption in Bangladesh from the sociological perspective by critically examining a selection of literature on the subject, and by seeking through this examination to explore the fundamental processes of the social formation of corruption in Bangladesh - both as a reality, as well as expressed in the literature selected on the subject.
Sociological interpretations must take into account social, political and economic forces, both as societal conditions, as well as rhetorical and historical influences which inform the discourse on corruption. It is also important to move beyond dichotomous, normative conclusions and focus instead on corruption as an exchange, as well as behaviour, process and outcome. Consequently, the challenge in exploring corruption from this perspective lies essentially in being able to critically focus on the subject of corruption as it exists in Bangladesh, together with the conceptual demands of the dominant discourse on the subject.
As will be discussed in some detail in this Study, many of the works under review are informed - either implicitly or explicitly - by an ethnocentric, modernising ideology, which is not necessarily applicable to the reality of conditions in developing societies like Bangladesh. The significance of these influences is enormous because they reflect the dominant discourse on corruption - especially as an issue of development -- in no uncertain terms.
Corruption as behaviour, process or activity, is impossible to quantify. Consequently, for social scientists the functional argument which focuses on the 'positive' aspects of corruption necessarily provides only a means of understanding process. Thus, while it might be argued that corruption functions as a useful mechanism to aid social, political or economic exchange, the relevance to social science lies in the process as activity, without reference to its normative qualities. Consequently, while this Study adopts many 'functional' arguments, it does so in a non-judgemental way, the aim being to further the understanding of the process by which corruption takes place in a given situation.
Eliminating Corruption
The ultimate aim of this Study, and presumably of all similar research, is to eliminate corruption in Bangladesh. The question is, how can this be achieved? A popular notion, reflected to some extent in the Annotated Bibliography, is to simply stamp out corruption. There is no doubt about the need to end corruption, but it is worth asking if the solution is to simply mount an attack on corruption or indeed, as is also often suggested, on its root cause. Apart from the fact that there are different points of view on exactly what constitutes the root cause of corruption, it is also moot to consider that repeated attempts to do so have not met with success. By all accounts, Bangladesh is still - perhaps more so now, than ever before - a corrupt polity, society and economy.
It is concluded in this Study that part of the solution to corruption lies in posing questions which address the fundamental social concepts of corruption as a prerequisite of all research and especially of any sociological research on the subject, thus encouraging a more searching and comprehensive 'assault' on the culprit. In other words, before devising programmes to eliminate corruption we must know a great deal more about its nature, characteristics and patterns.
It is further concluded that a study of corruption must be more than a piece of evaluation which examines a set of conditions within a predetermined framework. Too often, developing societies have been subjected to these types of appraisal and, predictably, have been found wanting. When society is assessed within a pre-determined framework which is alien to the problems of the real (Bangladeshi) world, wherein corruption exists as an institutionalised mechanism of exchange under specific socio-economic conditions, the existence of any differences tend to be dismissed as departures from the norm, or negatively assessed, or even completely misunderstood.
This Study finds a considerable number of works on corruption or related topics to be influenced by predetermined influences. A key conclusion reached by this analysis therefore, is that there is a need to assimilate an objective outline of appraisal before undertaking any research on corruption and/or initiating measures to eliminate it.
Defining Corruption
Corruption is not identifiable as a single, separate, independent entity which can be isolated and destroyed. Corruption is a complex set of processes involving human behaviour and many other variables, some of which are difficult to recognise or measure. Even though corruption manifests itself as a force on its own and often generates its own momentum, it is linked to many other factors, and it is by understanding these factors that we can hope to understand corruption.
Understanding corruption is therefore the first step in eradicating or, at least, containing corruption. In order to understand corruption, we have to first define it.
There are several meanings of the word corruption but when we use the term, we usually refer to a specific kind of exchange, activity or behaviour. For instance, corruption could mean a process of physical decay or degeneration; the loss of innocence; a state of moral impurity or moral deterioration; perversion in taste or language; and also the wrongful, negligent or wilfully corrupt act of a public official in the discharge of his or her public duties.
It is this last meaning of corruption, as the destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties (Theobald, 1990) which features most often in our language. Defined also as 'the misuse of public power for private profit', it is this specific definition of corruption which dominates our interpretation of the term.
Therefore, when we discuss corruption in Bangladesh, we are referring to the exchange, activity, process or behaviour which occurs when the public domain comes into contact with the private domain. From this definition, it is obvious that corruption carries within it several assumptions - of a 'public' as opposed to a 'private' domain; an official code of behaviour as opposed to an unofficial code of behaviour; the existence of a public or state apparatus; and even the existence of a particular kind of social, economic and political organisation (within which the public and private can operate smoothly).
These assumptions, embodied in the popular meaning of corruption, are significant because definitions aside, when it comes to dealing with corruption - at the political, economic and certainly, at the sociological level - it is often difficult to decide exactly what constitutes corruption.
For example, a question which is frequently posed is whether corruption is an age-old practice or a relatively new innovation. In the specific definition which we use most commonly both in our lexicon and in this Study, corruption can only apply to a situation in which there is a clear and specific demarcation between the 'public' and the 'private'. In 'pre-modern' times, when political organisation was based on kingship, there was no clear demarcation between the ruler's public and private duties, rights or responsibilities. Yet, there is evidence that corruption did exist in 'pre-modern' times (Theobald, 1990 p. 41- 45 and passim). So was the corruption of an earlier era a different kind of corruption, and if so, what made it different? How can we distinguish between the older and newer versions of corruption?
In answer to these questions it may be said that yes, what constituted corruption in an earlier era was different from what constitutes corruption now in the sense that the present notion of corruption - as the 'misuse of public office for private profit' - has emerged as a result of a particular historical context and socio-economic circumstances. This historically specific notion is discussed in some detail below, but what can be stated here is that corruption as we define it now can be distinguished from the older variety, so to speak, mainly because it rests on the fundamental assumption that the world is divided into distinct, 'public' and 'private' spheres of influence.
In fact, it must be noted that in our quest to understand corruption, it is this very assumption which presents the most obvious challenge because, as we will discuss below, the question of what is 'public' and what is 'private' is open to much interpretation.
At this stage, it can be summarised that while we do have a specific meaning of corruption as a starting point for our discussion, what constitutes corruption within the parameters of the specific definition depends on a number of variables. Consequently, the specific definition which we use is itself problematic and subject to debate.
Applying the Definition
Definitions of corruption are important for two main reasons. First, because the options which offer themselves indicate to a great extent the varied and often over-lapping meanings of corruption and the consequent difficulties in finding compact explanations for the term. Second, because when it comes to application, corruption as we have defined it, is problematic.
While it can be said that corruption usually describes an activity of the public and the private sectors, or of the state in relation to the market, exactly what constitutes corruption is the subject of some debate. If corruption refers to the (illegal) diversion of public resources into unauthorised private use, does it refer only to the corrupt behaviour of officials or to those private individuals who interact with officials? In this sense, therefore, is corruption about the state or about the market? In terms of social exchange, there seems to be little difference between the way a public official or a private individual behave; or between interactions between people and the state and the interactions between people in markets. In fact, it might even be argued that instead of becoming the formal regulator of an immoral market, the state, too, is immoral in the sense that it takes on the functions of allocation in an imperfect market. Can the actions of the state, as a player in the marketplace, therefore be seen as corrupt in a sociological sense? (Wood, 1994)
Furthermore, how do we resolve questions of motive and power in these relationships, for if the private individuals are seeking to secure what is theirs by right, but which is only made available to them if they enter into informal transactions with officials who control these rights, does that constitute corruption? The example of a repressive regime, where officials may have to be bribed in order to prevent torture or death, illustrates one of the varied ways in which the application of a specific meaning of corruption might pose a serious dilemma (Theobald, 1990).
Corruption describes behaviour which is usually unacceptable to society, consequently there are criminal and legal sides to this definition as well. But when it comes to the actual application of official responsibility or actions, especially on a day-to-day basis, legal definitions are not always enough - indeed, under the guise of regulations, they may even create a rigid bureaucracy which becomes inefficient and eventually requires 'speed-money' or other forms of graft to make it work (Guhan and Paul, 1997). Indeed as one analyst has noted, there is only one thing worse than a 'rigid, over-centralised dishonest bureaucracy' and that is, a 'rigid, over-centralised honest bureaucracy'. In a perverse sort of way, therefore, corruption can therefore actually enable the public sector (and the economy) to function.
The problematic in the 'public office for private profit' definition lies in the reality that for public officials to efficiently discharge their duties, they require some degree of flexibility and yet, their office is also open to abuse. It is difficult to decide, therefore, exactly which act of public office can be termed 'discretionary' and which 'corrupt'.
For instance, as one interesting work in the Annotated Bibliography points out, for a public servant in Bangladesh, what is the difference between coming habitually late to work, receiving gifts, keeping people in power 'in good humour', or committing a corrupt act entirely because of pressure from a 'controlling forum'? (Hussain, 1990) The author of this work, entitled Corruption in Public Offices: Some Conceptual Issues in the Context of Bangladesh, analyses responses to questions like these which are part of a questionnaire circulated to public officials in Bangladesh. The responses collated by him indicate that under certain circumstances, a public servant has to be 'corrupt' but a majority does not regard this to be corruption: it all depends on the circumstances. Consequently, while it can be said that there are degrees of corruption, from the subtle practice of keeping powerful people happy, to the outright act of receiving a bribe, it is also worth noting that ambiguities remain and it is difficult to decide which would be considered 'more' corrupt - the misappropriation of public funds for the purchase of private luxuries, or the use of influence by a public official to obtain a particularly lucrative job for a kin or a client.
Needless to say, these questions are difficult, even impossible to answer with complete certainty. Which is why other suggestions are put forward. For instance, some people suggest that corruption should be defined as an act which goes against the 'public interest'. But there is debate over what constitutes the 'public interest'. A similar suggestion with regard to 'public opinion' as a criterion for identifying corruption is also problematic because, among other reasons, public opinion can vary from time to time and from place to place. And, as has been already stated, a legal definition is also not without drawbacks for it would imply a demarcation of potentially rigid boundaries which would preclude consideration of the more subtle forms of corruption, for instance, nepotism.
Impact of Corruption
A significant consideration in this discussion must be the impact of corruption and with it, the moral impact of corrupt acts, especially when committed by the state. Although there is considerable debate about the causes of corruption, and also about the manner in which corruption manifests itself, there can be no denying the negative impact of corruption. True, there are arguments which claim that, under certain circumstances, corruption can be beneficial in oiling the wheels of a rigid, over-regulated economy, in providing a safety-valve from repressive regimes, in overcoming delays caused by administrative hurdles and even in personalising what would otherwise have been an impersonal and uncaring distribution system. (Theobald, 1990; Guhan and Paul, 1997) Examples of graft in the former Soviet Union, and the patronage system in the cities of the United States which originated in the 1830s, are often used to illustrate the instrumental advantages of corruption (Theobald, 1990).
Similarly, it is argued that in the developing world, corruption is a form of indirect taxation which, if removed, would cause bottlenecks which would prevent the smooth functioning of government and business (Consumark Limited, undated, Paper I, p. 17). Furthermore, analysts argue against the assertion that corruption is a waste of resources. They point out the fallacy in the assumption that resources 'diverted' into graft would otherwise have been spent productively, or redistributed to the poor, claiming that resources 'saved' from graft would most likely be spent on luxury items, not on development projects. In other words, in a situation of chronic scarcity which is what exists in the developing world, there would be other ways in which income inequities would be maintained.
It is true that under certain circumstances, corruption can provide some instrumental advantages. It is possible that without corruption, administration in many parts of the developing world would - at least temporarily - be impeded. It is also undoubtedly true that under certain conditions, corruption lends a humanising aspect to what may otherwise have been an impersonal and rigid exchange. In economic terms there is no difference between illicit and licit goods indeed, as an economic exchange, corruption often stabilises the business environment, functioning as an important medium through which the logic of the market asserts itself. Examples abound, a well-known one being the case of Brazil where a class of brokers called despachante had emerged entirely to act as intermediaries in a bureaucratic maze which evidently was so complex that in one celebrated case, it required 1470 separate legal actions, 13 government ministries and 50 agencies to obtain a single export license (Theobald, 1990, p. 157 ).
Arguments in support of corruption can be applied to many developing societies, where a large bureaucracy is usually so extended and inefficient, that business and trade can only function with the aid of consistent corruption. In Bangladesh, certainly, although corruption is seen to be a serious problem, it is also evident that corruption has its uses. Two works in particular convey the distinct impression that without corruption, business would be paralysed (Consumark, undated; Quddus, in Ali, et al, 1996). As these studies explain, the plethora of bureaucratic rules and regulations in the country is such that entrepreneurs like an ordinary rickshaw malik (owner) or a garment exporter can survive only by being corrupt.
But do these instances imply that we might regard corruption as being beneficial in any way?
Granted, that in the absence of exchanges which make the bureaucracy 'flexible', much activity in Bangladesh would come to a halt. But surely the illicit exchange, or the bribe, itself, is not the problem. It is extremely important to realise that the 'benefits' of corruption are, in all likelihood, masking symptoms of a seriously dysfunctional socio-economic or political system. It is more than likely that corruption has emerged because of other, hidden or deep-seated problems or, as is often the case in the developing world, corruption flourishes because structures have been imposed on people without due consideration of their applicability in these environments.
Whatever the circumstances or the historical reasons, there is no getting away from the fact that the impact of corruption is negative. Furthermore, although corruption in any form is undesirable, it appears to be considerably less acceptable when the state is corrupt. This is partly because the state presumes upon the membership and loyalty of its citizens - something which a private body does not (cannot) assume. Consequently, because the state has a special position, and is regarded to be a neutral, impartial, and representative body which will provide for and protect the rights of the people, any perversion of this understanding is regarded to be far more serious than if the same act were carried out by a private body.
In fact, the behaviour of the state is important for other reasons as well. To borrow from another discussion, the behaviour of the state is significant because the market cannot be depended upon to be caring - indeed, it is not meant to be a caring organ. As Amartya Sen explains in a discussion on the behaviour of the market during the Irish famine in the 1840s, the reason the market continued to export potatoes to Britain from Ireland during the famine was because the market was not concerned with relative needs - only with relative demand. (Sen, in Abdullah and Khan, (eds) 1996). In Sen's words, the market is an 'organ of alienation' which is neither friendly, nor hostile, simply unconcerned about anything save comparative purchasing powers. (ibid., p. 23, 21). In other words, the market does not care if people starve in a famine or eat in a famine. This does not mean that the market is an evil institution, but it implies that someone has to care, especially if the market does not. And that is why the state, in addition to being the only institution which, under given circumstances, can be expected to be moral, also becomes the repository of much human aspiration. This is one reason why, when the state is corrupt, it undermines the moral fabric of society.
A pertinent objection to corruption is the reality that it is virtually impossible to confine corruption to those areas, for instance, where its effects are deemed to be desirable. (Theobald, 1990). Consequently, it is safe to conclude as the World Bank did some 15 years ago, that corruption weakens the effectiveness of governments, undermines popular confidence in the public service, and leads to a situation where public servants will do nothing without bribes. The purchase of favours is nothing but an unproductive exercise. Corruption enables the wealthy, the powerful and the unscrupulous, at the expense of law-abiding citizens of a country. (Theobald, 1990)
In other words, the general consensus seems to be that although corruption may have some instrumental advantages, it is undesirable in the balance and should be controlled, as far as possible. It may therefore be summarised that even though the definition of corruption as an activity which applies to the misuse of public office continues to have limitations, in the absence of a more acceptable definition, and because the dominant socio-economic and political model of our time is premised on a demarcation of the 'public' and the 'private' spheres within a modern nation-state which the popular definition reflects, it is this definition which continues to provide the basis for discussions on corruption.
As we have already noted, the dichotomy of 'public' and 'private' continues to be problematic. How and why this is so can best be explained by examining the historical basis of this definition.
The Rational-Legal Paradigm
At the core of the 'public power for private profit' definition lies the assumption that there are two discrete private and public worlds, separated by clearly demarcated boundaries. This definition is the product of a historically specific, and ideologically biased paradigm. An integral component of this paradigm is the ideal of the 'rational-legal bureaucracy', a term defined by Max Weber and adopted by the developed, as the dominant model of public service and state-craft (Theobald, 1990). The Weberian ideal envisages a hierarchical organisation of public servants chosen according to merit, who are paid a regular salary according to rank, and who are guided through clearly outlined rules and regulations, to make decisions based on objective, universalistic criteria, all the while remembering to scrupulously segregate public affairs from private interests (Ibid.).
While the model itself began somewhat incidentally, accompanying the emergence of the nation-state in nineteenth century Europe, it was, like the concept of the new nation-state, shaped by major political and social changes of its time. It is worth noting that as a consequence of these changes the state was redefined as the 'harbinger and main instrument of social change', as well as the 'trigger for and protector of the modern institutions associated with industrial capitalism.' (Nandy, in Sachs, 1992, p. 264 - 274) In one way or another, this European notion of the nation-state, together with the structure and processes of capitalist industrialisation, organised under the rubric of 'liberal-democracy' have informed subsequent political development in the third world. The rational-legal model of bureaucracy has been an integral part of this influence.
Problem with the Paradigm
The problem with the rational-legal paradigm is, however, three-fold. First, as a theoretical concept, it is problematic to blur ideal and reality, or concept and evidence. In other words, the application of a Weberian ideal which lies outside the reality of the social structure of Bangladesh, weakens any analysis because, "the comparison is being made between reality and rhetoric respectively, or between actual behavioural patterns on the one hand and ideal-type propositions on the other." (Wood, 1994 p. 533). In the rational-legal paradigm, the existence of a patron-client based organisation, and a multi-transactional culture, and their respective interactions with the state can only be interpreted as a subversion of the principle of bureaucratic rationality (Wood,1994 ). In this paradigm there can be no reconciliation between evidence and concept, or theory and practice (Ibid.).
The second problem with this paradigm is that, inasmuch as the bureaucratic structures of the developed world might be seen to approximate the rational-legal model, it is debatable whether the Weberian ideal, or a particular cultural ethic, or indeed, the influence of western liberal thought, can be held responsible for the establishment of this structure. Indeed, it can be argued that although there were far-reaching behavioural changes in Europe in the nineteenth century which ushered in the era defined as 'modern', these changes were not, as is often assumed, an emerging social work ethic inspired by protestantism and the cultural values which were informed by it, but rather the result of a "dramatic economic expansion" (Theobald, 1990, p. 151).
It was capitalistic industrialisation and the changes wrought from this innovation which allowed the fruits of the economic expansion to be enjoyed eventually by the masses - changes such as institutional growth, mass awareness, democratic and accountable norms of political and social organisation. For the social scientist it is worth noting that it was the "development of public accountability and awareness of its necessity, rather than some alleged diffusion of greater honesty" in the developed world that eventually defined notions of public and political corruption (Ibid., p. 152).
In fact, the sometimes violent intervention of the state in the market was also a major factor in the development of the national economy, an activity which is often subsumed under the theory that market forces emerged on the European landscape, in spite of the so-called limitations of the state. (Polanyi, 1944). The part played by the industrial revolution and the state in the 'emancipation' of the market in the developed world is crucial to an analysis of the future of the state in general and in the developing world in particular. At the same time, it must be taken into account that the 'bureaucratic principle', as embodied in the notion of a corruption-free public service in the developed world is based on a historically specific paradigm (Theobald, 1990, p. 3).
Which leads us to the third problem with the paradigm and this is that, in any case, the assumption that the developed world has managed to replicate the institution of a rational-legal bureaucracy which conforms perfectly to the Weberian ideal is an extremely debatable, some would say mythical notion. Public administration cannot function without some degree of 'flexibility' and therefore, reality in the developed world is quite different from the idealised role model. To sum it up:
....no institutional apparatus can cohere on the basis of rational-legal principles alone. The state apparatus is necessarily pervaded by personal exchanges expressed through networks which embody some combination of ideal and material interests and along which flow resources such as friendship, various forms of support, information, material inducements and suchlike. In no organisational context is it possible to maintain a permanent and impenetrable division between public resources and private interests. In other words, patrimonialism is both normal and necessary at all levels of public (and private) bureaucracies... (Theobald, 1990 p. 131 - 132)
Does this mean, therefore, that under certain circumstances, corruption is normal? The difficulty in answering this question with any degree of certainty illustrates the problematic just discussed. It can be argued, however, that corruption appears easier to 'absorb' or accept as normal, under certain conditions and circumstances. Why this should be so depends on a range of factors, some of which are discussed below.
A Question of Perception
As far as the developed world is concerned, there is ample evidence of corruption in the public sector, involving the state apparatus and politicians, in petty as well as in comparatively more lucrative illicit exchanges. And yet, there is a distinct impression that the countries of the developed world boast of a more or less 'clean' bureaucracy and even, with a few notable exceptions, of a corruption-free polity. The observation of Gunnar Myrdal in the influential work, Asian Drama, in 1968, illustrates a commonly held view. Discussing corruption in the developing world, he observed: "Concerning the general level of corruption it is unquestionably much higher than in Western countries, (even including the US) or in the Communist countries." The reasons for this impression are worth examining because they point to a fundamental bias in perspective which, in turn, has an effect on how we understand corruption.
A primary factor to consider is perception. A recent poll by Transparency International (TI) of how business communities in some 47 countries around the world perceive corruption is extremely interesting. In this poll, businessmen working for multinationals companies and institutions were asked to rank countries according to the level of corruption and its impact on commercial and social life. In the TI Corruption Perception Index for 1997 which emerged as a result of this poll, Nigeria came out as the most corrupt country among 52 economies under scrutiny, and Denmark as the least corrupt. Among the most corrupt countries, there were far more countries from the developing world than from the developed - an aspect which was fairly publicised by the media. There was some adverse reaction to this Index, the criticism being that the businessmen polled were mainly from the developed world and hence, biased in their attitudes.
The stated intention of the poll, as TI chairman Peter Eigen explained, was not to indicate the level of corruption in any country, but to present an assessment of the perception about corruption. To that end, this poll is faithful. It clearly demonstrates that business, particularly in developed countries views corruption as being higher in the developing world.
An interesting point is how corruption in the developing countries is linked to actions by, and activities in the developed countries. Measurements aside, as the chairman of TI again states, "a large share of the corruption (in developing countries) is also the product of multinational corporations, head-quartered in leading industrial countries, using bribery and kick-backs to buy contracts in the developing world and the countries in transition." It is worth noting that in spite of the links between foreign investment and corruption in the developing world, the perception remains that it is the developing world which is 'more' corrupt.
Measuring Corruption
Which leads us to a fundamental question and that is whether we can measure corruption with any degree of accuracy. If so, is there a way of deciding which countries are 'more' and which are 'less' corrupt than others?
The literature on corruption in Bangladesh contains innumerable references to measurements of corruption, the authors implying with reference to different situations that there are greater, more insidious, more pervasive, and more blatant instances of corruption now than have existed before. The problem is, there is no way of knowing for sure if at all, and to what extent, the authors are accurate. One way of finding our about the level of corruption in a given society could be by monitoring the media, and other public forum. But these signposts can be extremely misleading. If anything, corruption may acquire bigger proportions in certain situations, for instance under a repressive regime, but continue to remain 'hidden' from public view. And conversely, in situations where there is greater public discussion of corruption it does not follow that there is 'more' corruption, because where the media is free, there is likely to be more discussion of a subject - and also, more accountability. In other words, media or other public methods of gauging the 'size' of corruption are not reliable.
In economic and development terms, corruption can be quantified by placing a monetary value against a corrupt act. And so, for instance, the 'cost' of paying bribes in the running of a garment industry can be calculated (Quddus, in Ali, et al 1996) or, a similar calculation can be made with reference to rickshaw owners and entrepreneurs (Consumark, undated). It can also be shown how, for instance in the agricultural credit market in Bangladesh, the effective interest rate from a formal credit source (which includes a bribe), and the informal interest rate from an informal source, are eventually equal in equilibrium, the point being that market forces will encourage price adjustments in order to incorporate the opportunity cost of a service or product (Gupta and Chaudhuri, 1997). The formal 'cost' of credit to the borrower can therefore be calculated as being the same as the informal cost, even if the formal interest rate is lower than the informal rate. (Ibid.)
But by far and large, calculations of the 'cost' of corruption are misleading. As Geoffrey Wood argues, in monopoly conditions, when the only option for a consumer of public resources is to accept the terms of the monopolist, or accept total exit, the consumer will continue to pay the bribe demanded for a product because total exit is not an option (Wood, 1994). It is much the same situation as the members of a society decrying the level of corruption within that society but being able to do nothing about it because the only option is to refuse to live in that society. In such circumstances, there is no option, and hence, the 'cost' of corruption is infinite.
Consequently, it can be asserted that the so-called cost of corruption cannot be relied upon as a guide to understanding corruption, because although corruption as an economic exchange can be quantified under certain conditions, this is no indication of its real value. The point which must be made is that corruption is more than an economic exchange. Certainly, there is no calculation which can account precisely for the social impact of corruption. There is no foolproof way of measuring the loss entailed by corruption in a social and psychological sense - just as there is no way of calculating the social 'advantages' which might accrue from corruption.
Although measurements of corruption are unreliable and imprecise, there is a general impression that some parts of the world are 'more' corrupt than others. Indeed, as stated earlier, there is a general impression that the developed world is less corrupt that the developing world. Certainly, contemporary perceptions seem to be inclined in this direction. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for 1997, quoted in the previous section, demonstrates that among the 52 countries assessed in the poll, the top 30 countries are predominantly from the developed world. The notable exceptions are, Singapore (9th), Hong Kong (18th), Costa Rica (22nd), Chile (23rd). In the bottom, i.e. 'more' corrupt, section of this Index, there are no countries from the developed world.
<<<previous |
|
|
|
|
