Paper III

Annotated Bibliography

Books

Adams, Patricia, Odious Debts, Loose Lending, Corruption and the Third World Environmental Legacy. London, Earthscan, 1991, 252 pp

A collection of articles, in which article 14 titled ‘Corruption in High and Not-So-High Places’ describes, among other things, corruption in state-owned development banks in the Third World.

There is not much on Bangladesh as such, but parallels with other Third World countries can be seen. In one specific reference to Bangladesh, the writer describes how the Asian Development Bank (ADB) investigated $300 million in defaults on loans which the ADB and two other banks had provided to two nationalised Bangladeshi banks. It found that local businessmen had borrowed cash for projects "without any serious intention of pursuing such projects."

Although the businessmen were only required to put down 5 percent to 7.5 percent of a project’s cost themselves, even the down payment was often borrowed. The Asian Development Bank found a "lack of motivation and indifference to successful operation" because fund-raising was so easy. Repayments by companies were extremely rare, with 90 percent of industrial loans having to be rescheduled.

In this analysis, the incidence of "loose-lending corruption" in Bangladesh is linked to easy access to funds, as well as a perceived lack of motivation and interest in the outcome of the project on the part of borrowers. The implications here are that corruption is driven mainly by circumstances, in this case the availability of capital which, in turn encourages negative attitudes, such as seem to have been held by local businessmen in Bangladesh.

Ahmad, Ashab-uddin, Ghoosh (Bribe). Dhaka, Bostu Prokashan, 1994, (2nd edition), 112 pp

This is a collection of some 23 articles on ‘ghoosh’ or ‘bribe’, published in daily newspapers during the 1980s. The author, a college teacher in his early life who became actively associated with politics after 1953, is a prolific writer. His articles are satirical personal columns, rich in the diversity of first-hand encounters and experiences which he brings to bear as he reflects on the subject of corruption.

The collections offers much by way of information on the social manifestations of corruption. There is, for instance, an account of how public servants exploit their children’s birthday parties and/or weddings as an occasion to receive or procure bribes. Several other pretexts commonly used by officials to obtain bribes - such as the "sudden" marriage of a daughter, or an equally "sudden" sickness in the family - are discussed. Through these accounts, the writer suggests that public servants use their families, traditional occasions or personal crises to camouflage rent-seeking on a consistent basis. These accounts also reinforce the impression that corruption is pervasive and socially fairly acceptable.

For social scientists, this collection offers a primary source of information on the contemporary attitudes towards corruption. Here the most significant points to emerge are that corruption is seen to be caused by a multitude of circumstances, and no single fact is held responsible for its existence. Furthermore, it is also clear from this work that corruption is perceived to be a serious social issue, and not just a matter which falls within the purview of the government, the religious bodies or economists.

The author attributes the causes of corruption to a host of circumstances and motives, from economic inequities, to the latent profit motive present in human beings. In most instances, it is the absence of proper education, a code of values and an overall lack of social responsibility which makes people succumb to its charms. In addition to advocating major changes in people’s attitudes and ethics, the author feels that a revolutionary political leadership is a key factor in winning the battle against corruption.

Ahmed, Moudud, Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Dhaka, University Press Ltd, 1983, 340 pp

The importance of this book in the literature on corruption in Bangladesh is primarily because it provides a detailed account of the first four years of government in Bangladesh, commonly characterised as the most turbulent, and one of the most corrupt, in its history. The political and socio-economic forces which shaped the events of those years have had far reaching consequences on Bangladesh and a marked feature of government and politics during this time was a rise in the incidence of corruption. By all accounts, it seemed almost to have become a way of life. Consequently, while the narrative is mainly about the sweeping changes which took place in Bangladesh government and politics, it is also about the many different and often minute ways in which corruption seeped into and became a part of the social fabric of Bangladesh.

Moudud’s work draws a realistic picture of the early years of Bangladesh when corruption manifested itself in an all-pervasive manner. The country came into being following a civil war and therefore, not only was it unprepared in terms of experience to cope with the demands of administering a country, but also its infra-structure had been seriously damaged. And even though Bangladesh adopted a system of parliamentary democracy under the leadership of its founding father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman he, himself, soon brought in radical changes in both political and economic policy. There was a sense of deep insecurity across the land as chronic shortages of food and resources reached crisis proportions and the government appeared to be completely overwhelmed by the situation. In this backdrop, corruption took hold not only of the body politic, but seemed to have become a way of life.

Although Moudud’s work is primarily an account of the policy and processes introduced by the Awami League and Sheikh Mujib during this time, the narrative includes evidence of corruption in virtually every sphere of state activity. Since the private sector had been drastically reduced by a nationalisation policy introduced in March 1972 under which approximately 80 per cent of the industrial, banking and insurance business came under government control, the state’s activities extended wide. The avenues and methods of extortion, fraud, bribery and various other forms of corruption which radiated from the state are well documented in this work.

The author identifies a general public disenchantment with the rhetoric of anti-corruption, with regard to the application of special anti-corruption laws, implementation of new policy and even when the leader himself publicly embarked on a "crusade against corruption and nepotism". It is clear that there is a sense of intense disillusionment with the state apparatus, a growing public anger at the rampant corruption of the ruling party especially in connection with the food crisis of 1974, as well as with the misappropriation of relief goods immediately after Independence. In other words, as the crisis of the Mujib era deepens, corruption becomes general and undermines the moral fibre of society. Ultimately, this sense of pervasive corruption hangs over the demise of Sheikh Mujib, his family and his government.

Maudud’s account traces the ascendancy of corruption inside government to increasing political and economic pressure. Patronage becomes "an instrument of sharing power"(34), and corruption a tool of political survival. There is also a sense that something is missing: political leaders are devoid of ‘patriotic zeal’, ‘dedication’ or ‘missionary zeal’ and that is why they succumb so easily to the forces of negativity and corruption (Ibid.).

Akhter, Muhammad Yeahia, Durnitir Swarup Onneshon: Bangladesh (Search for the Nature of Corruption: Bangladesh). Dhaka, Nibedon Printers and Publications, 1991, 241 pp

An analysis of corruption in Bangladesh with reference to the political, social and administrative spheres, as well as issues related to development. Supported by secondary sources which include academic and field research, this is a wide-ranging work, divided into nine chapters which cover the following:

(i) Political corruption in Bangladesh: Political murder

(ii) Corruption and Development: Bangladesh perspective

(iii) Controlling administrative corruption: Some suggestions

(iv) Administrative decentralisation and corruption at grassroots: Bangladesh model.

(v) Corruption in the form of patron-client relations: Bangladesh model

(vi) Electoral corruption in Bangladesh: Nature and redress

(vii) Corruption in Employment: Administration and Educational Fields

(viii) Form of administrative corruption : A case study of an organisation in Bangladesh

(ix) Corruption: A neglected topic in the studies of Bangladesh Society.

This work looks at corruption in Bangladesh from various aspects, but the aim of the examination is essentially the same: to record, recognise and combat the extent and enormity of corruption in Bangladesh. Corruption is seen as a dangerous and harmful universal phenomenon which becomes even more harmful in a poor country like Bangladesh.

Akhter’s perspective is that corruption is an evil and cannot have any redeeming qualities. Referring to the argument put forth by certain western scholars that corruption can play a role in the development of third world countries, the writer supports the view of third world analysts that, "it is monstrous for these well-intentioned and largely misguided scholars to suggest corruption as a practical and efficient instrument for rapid development in Asia and Africa."

The work traces how successive governments in Bangladesh have pledged to fight corruption and have made sanctimonious pledges to this effect, noting how each government has failed to practice what it has preached. The author emphasises the example set by the East Asian nations such as Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaysia, in successfully limiting corruption. He suggests that Bangladesh could learn much from these examples if its leadership chooses to do so with sincerity and commitment.

Essentially, this work perceives corruption as an entity in itself. It sees corrupt practices and corrupt actions to be an unmitigated evil, multifarious in nature, complex in characteristics, and terrifying in the sum total of their impact. According to this work, the way to fight corruption is to address the entire range of corrupt practices, from actions by political leaders, to greater awareness in contemporary literature and to do so with a commitment to high moral values and a code of ethics.

For the social scientist, this work illustrates a commonly held view that corruption is an issue of morality, driven largely by a self-serving failing in human nature. The main actors in this work are political leaders, public servants, local officials, political candidates and members of the ruling elites. The victims are society, social values, ethical standards and the people in general. Corruption is seen to exist in an environment devoid of moral teaching and public awareness, fuelled by a self-seeking greed among ruling elites and their supporters/collaborators.

Ali, Sayed Tosharaf, Nirbachito Rajnoitic Column (Selected Political Writings). Dhaka, Al Amin Foundation, 1994, 447 pp

This is an anthology of articles published during the eighties and early nineties. Among 175 articles, four deal specifically with the subject of corruption. The main focus of these four articles is a high and wide-ranging level of corruption in the political sphere, with special emphasis on the existence of corruption within the political leadership in Bangladesh.

The author pins the blame for corruption on members of the government, as well as political leaders. For instance, in the article entitled, Montri MP Shokolkei Shoth Thakte Hobe, (Ministers, MPs, All Must Be Transparent) dated August 1993, the author discusses a proposal by a leading cabinet minister for parliamentary scrutiny of the commercial and financial interests of members of parliament. He relates how the proposal is categorically opposed by an opposition MP, a former minister, who argues that before a parliamentary investigation can be launched, the government itself should set an example of transparency by disclosing details of its ministers’ personal property and financial interests to the public. The issue ultimately remains unsettled.

Similarly, in another article the author describes how a particular section of the political leadership persists in denouncing corruption, while in reality they are the ones who perpetuate and sustain corruption in their midst. According to this work, the declarations of honesty by political leaders is no indication of their real intentions and in fact, there seems to be a connection between public denunciation of corruption and a rise in its strength and size. Thus, during the early eighties, when the country was ruled by the military, corruption was given a boost, so to speak, even as it was denounced in stronger terms than ever before by the government in power.

Among various reasons for the existence of corruption, the author feels an important aspect is the loss of the service-oriented character of political office which has been replaced by the more common practice of using political office for amassing immense wealth. This, in turn, has undermined public respect and confidence in the country’s political leadership.

In this account, corruption is linked to social values and standards. People in general are seen as victims who are powerless to do anything and thus lose confidence in the political leadership. The major players are political leaders themselves whose interests appear to be the major cause of the rise and continued existence of corruption in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, The Net: Power Structure in Ten Villages (rural study series 02), Dhaka, BRAC Prokashana, June 1986, (2nd edition), 93 pp

This study reveals how members of a small elite stratum in rural Bangladesh build up a network of contacts and relationships. These networks are then shown to be utilised for gaining access and control over scarce public and private resources. The work provides evidence of a widespread and entrenched level of corruption in the area of resource distribution in rural Bangladesh, together with the consequent difficulties of achieving development through conventional approaches.

The study is considerably thorough. It was based on an enquiry of local officials and leaders which was then cross-checked with the verbal accounts obtained from villagers in ten selected villages. The information was collected by members of BRAC’s field staff through their interaction with disadvantaged sections of the rural population during the Emergency Relief Programme conducted in drought affected areas in 1979. Detailed information was obtained about the manner in which people occupying positions of authority utilised their advantageous positions.

It became clear that the resources, in the form of government relief, were not reaching the poor and landless and instead their allocation was being controlled and their benefits enjoyed by a small number of powerful men, who had developed good connections with local government officials. This work goes on to describe a similar situation in forestry where, for example, by the very rapid cutting down and sale of timber in the public forests, a small number of rich and powerful men were able to make large profits from public resources. These men were also able to use their government connections, economic power and threats of violence, together with the actual use of force, to obtain control over the lands and actions of others.

An interesting feature of this study is that it highlights the impact of intervention on the dynamics of a community, specially with reference to corruption. In the course of this study it becomes clear that as a result of the interest shown in their situation, the landless members of the rural environment, i.e. the victims, begin to articulate their problems regarding misuse and misappropriation of resources by the powerful members of the community. The BRAC study notes that the landless villagers display a marked degree of assertiveness when they realise that the BRAC field staff are interested in their plight and are willing to hear their (as opposed to the elites’) side of the story. For instance, after the BRAC field staff have established reasonable contact with them, the villagers insist the field workers record their verbal complaints in black and white. In short, intervention makes the villagers become more conscious of the disparity of resource allocation, particularly that benefits intended for them, i.e. food- for- work, rations, education, etc, were not getting through because they were being intercepted by ‘the net’ between them and the central government (p. 2).

According to this study, it would be wrong to think that the principal victims of corruption are passive or unaware of what is happening to them. Although the victims cannot act on their own, because they are already aware of the problem it is possible to empower them. During the five months of the study, it was found that there was in increasing capacity for resistance among the disadvantaged groups surveyed in the ten villages.

For social scientists exploring corruption, this work is useful in identifying the rural power-holders, their relationships within the community, and how they maintain and extend their control over private and public resources, both those internal to the area and those coming from outside. This study focuses on the control of a few people over land, capital, the forest, food rations and education. It also looks at the way the power-holders maintain their control over state law-enforcing agencies (the BDR and police) and how they, themselves, will resort to the direct use of force to protect their interests. (p. 74-80).

Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, Who Gets What And Why, Resource Allocation in a Bangladeshi Village. BRAC Prokashana, September 1986, (2nd edition), 197 pp

First published in 1979, this study of rural development in Bangladesh looks at the policy and processes that govern resource allocation and behaviour in a single village called Dhankura, the aim being to ultimately design policy and processes which can equitably distribute resources in other villages of Bangladesh. While the work as a whole adds to the social scientist’s understanding of the sociology of a rural community in Bangladesh, its specific importance to the understanding of corruption is also valuable.

The framework of this study includes an understanding of the complex of resources, their structure and their flow, as well as the pattern of relationships and the distribution of power. As these fundamentals are examined, with reference to the realities in this village, it is evident not only that resource allocation is decided with reference to power and economic status, but also how it is done. There are plenty of examples, from the village doctor who will provide the less costly medicine to the poor, the more costly to the rich and charge a higher fee than agreed to by the government, to the manner in which government aid is allocated to the more powerful members of the village.

According to this study, the power structure in these villages is closely related to land ownership, kinship ties and the manner in which resources are diverted and distributed. The rural elite, usually landowners, are compelled to share resources with key members of the community in order to retain their status within the community. Who gets what and why depends on their importance: thus, an inner or core circle of supporters usually gets a bigger share than members of a wider group who also support the leader. This factor is consistently seen to be one of the most important in determining the rural power structure. Links established through patronage and mutual interest, cut across class lines and reinforce the position of the patron, while also sustaining the modes of distribution of scarce public resources within the more powerful and rich members of the village. Interestingly, while this study of Dhankura found evidence of trading activities in the area, it also found that the income derived from business was not perceived to be as socially valid as the income from land.

The overall impression from this study is that the appropriation of resources is governed by socio-economic and political ties in the community, resulting in (corrupt) practices which have become institutionalised in the marketplace. These practices have a serious impact on rural development. By providing a detailed picture of the rural power structure, this study highlights the circumstances and conditions under which socio-economic and political change might be encouraged or expected to take place so that corruption is contained and resources are distributed in a more equitable manner.

Chowdhury, A.N.M. Khaled, Law on Corruption. Chittagong, Published by Arjuman Chowdhury, 1984, (2nd edition), 108 pp

This book is a compilation of laws relating to corruption in Bangladesh, presented in the form of a handbook with annotated references. It is a comprehensive reference book, with virtually all the relevant case laws on the subject. Although this collection is useful mainly as a source of reference for members of the bench, the bar, students of law, and so on, it can provide valuable background information to the study of corruption in Bangladesh.

The Laws noted in this collection include :

The author’s interpretation of the significance of laws against corruption is worth noting. In the Preface to its first edition he writes:

"Upheavals like war, civil disturbances, social-economic turmoil in recent decades have added new dimensions to age-old crimes and criminal propensities warranting enactment of new laws specially in the sphere of Bribery and Corruption. Law is not something static; it is dynamic, changed circumstances necessitated enactment of laws to stamp out corruption and bribery of public servants."

Corruption is thus linked to changing circumstances, particularly to events such as war and civil strife, or periods of insecurity and uncertainty. Furthermore, crime and corruption are seen as dynamic social conditions which can increase under certain circumstances. Although corruption is perceived to be "age-old", it is also capable of becoming more dangerous at certain times. Law, which is seen here as the major deterrent of corruption, is therefore required to quell or control the increase of crime and corruption.

Chowdhury, Mufiz, Durniti, Biplob O Samakalin Prosonga (Corruption, Revolution and Contemporary Issues). Dhaka, Hakkani Publishers, 1983, 129 pp

This book is an anthology of essays on contemporary social problems, oil exploration in Bangladesh and travels abroad. Among 18 essays, the first is titled Durnity (Corruption).

Durnity analyses the different causes of corruption and suggests measures to contain it. In the author’s view, it a ‘feeling of want’ which is the root cause of corruption. It follows from this that anybody whether they are rich or poor, or whether they belong to any economic class, may be inclined to corruption. In the author’s view, the difference between a bribe received by a poor employee and a bribe taken by a top official is that while the former takes a bribe out of a ‘real’ want or feeling of want, a top official seeks rent to fulfil a desire for more luxuries.

Furthermore, the author also believes that the phenomenon of rent-seeking is due to the impact of western civilisation which brings with it the offer of indulgence, ease, pleasure and the luxuries of a new world, and for that end there is demand for consumer products. The author suggests ways to control corruption. These include the education of the masses, ‘with a minimum of moral thoughts’, the adoption of ‘an ideal definition of life’, an ‘austere economic plan’ which ensures a minimum security of life and the creation of an environment which encourages high-minded leaders with integrity to come to the forefront of politics and government.

In essence, this essay reinforces the viewpoint offered in other works on corruption in Bangladesh, that a particular system, in this case capitalism, is responsible for the existence of corruption. Furthermore, the work perceives different levels of corruption: some corrupt acts are less corrupt than others. Thus, to the author the act of bribe-taking by a poor man is the result of a ‘real’ want and by inference, less corrupt, while the corrupt actions of a rich man are more corrupt because they are driven by a need for luxuries, and influenced by a western-inspired need for consumer products. There is a strong moral tone to this essay, as well as an underlying reliance on the dichotomy of eastern versus western, good versus bad, and austerity versus affluence.

Hussain, Saadat, Corruption in Public Offices: Some Conceptual Issues in the Context of Bangladesh. Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development. Comilla, 1990, 36 pp

A rare work in that it consists of an analytical appraisal of corruption with specific reference to a survey of public officials in Bangladesh, this work offers interesting insights into the sociology of corruption. The survey questionnaire is in itself an informative document, and together with the results, as interpreted by the author, provides an indication of contemporary perceptions of corruption within the bureaucracy. Survey questions range from whether it is corruption to come habitually late to work, or whether motive is important in committing a corrupt act, or whether all violations of rules might be considered corrupt, or whether being forced by a "controlling forum" to commit corrupt acts could be regarded as corruption. (According to this survey, 62 per cent felt that it was not corrupt since it was performed under duress).

There are a range of similar questions and their results which focus on a selection of extenuating circumstances. For instance, whether acts of nepotism towards civil servants in the former East Pakistan constituted corruption since it was believed to be in the interests of the majority in East Pakistan, or whether simply breaking a public service rule, even if that rule is against the interest of one’s national interest, constitutes corruption.

Other questions and arguments focus on the giving and receiving of gifts, on keeping people in power ‘in good humour’, and on building up one’s own career by neglecting one’s duties. It must be pointed out that this work is fairly brief, is somewhat ambiguous in language and expression and is thus somewhat difficult to assess. Nevertheless, it highlights the problems in deciding exactly what constitutes the ‘proper’ use of public office. This work also reinforces the view that the rational-legal model of bureaucracy is an ideal rather than a reality, particularly in the context of Bangladesh.

Jahan, Rounaq, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues. Dhaka, University Press Ltd, 1980, 231 pp

A collection of 12 articles written over a period of 10 years, from 1970, to 1980, focusing on separate stages of political change in Bangladesh, from the last ten years of East Pakistan to the Ziaur Rahman regime in 1980. Although each article deals with socio-political issues which arise during a specific period, a major argument emerges in this collection which, in turn, indirectly highlights the root causes, existence and impact of corruption in Bangladesh.

The argument is basically that the repeated failure of political government, leadership and organisation in Bangladesh is due not so much to the adoption of a particular model, as it is to its abandonment. The model in question is the western liberal-democratic model of government, which Bangladesh like many post-colonial societies adopted initially, mainly because the primary goal of this model - the attainment of democracy -- suited the political leadership of the time whose primary aim was to achieve independence from colonial rule. But, argues Jahan, once independence had been achieved, the model was abandoned, and with it, the mechanisms which would made it work - mechanisms such as institution building, party politics, public administration, among others - were abandoned and substituted by more familiar, traditional mechanisms of socio-political organisation, which were based on kinship ties, patron-client relationships, factional allegiances and a highly personalised administration.

These mechanisms were preferred and sustained for various reasons, including an overriding goal of the leadership in Bangladesh to remain in power, but their result was often to jeopardise their very creators by unleashing all manner of unstable forces. As a result, there were public protests, political crises, and acts of violence in Bangladesh, one after the other.

According to Jahan, the political turbulence came about because ruling elites grossly violated ‘the rules of the game’ (p. 95). By creating ‘privatised’ governments, eroding institutions, challenging the rule of law, weakening civil society and depending more and more on the influence of charismatic leaders (whose role it was to balance the precarious, volatile and unpredictable political equation, even as they, themselves, became the sum total of political power and political failure in the land), successive governments in Bangladesh have failed to adhere to the checks and balances which would have enabled liberal-democracy to function and produce coherent results.

Raunaq Jahan’s collection does not deal with corruption as a subject, but it incorporates corruption in various forms - patronage, patron-client ties - and during particular periods of upheaval - the fall of governments, jailing of leaders, the distribution of relief goods - as almost a given. The manner in which the author deals with the various forms of corruption, clearly implies that corruption is perceived not as an entity in itself, but rather as the by-product of the nature of political organisation which exists in Bangladesh. It is the social, economic and political glue which binds together traditional mechanisms of governance, even as it erodes those institutions which would sustain (western) democratic forms of governance. Furthermore, in this argument, corruption is seen not as an end in itself, but as the means to an end. It is the element which a certain style of socio-political organisation encourages and which political leaders, from the grassroots to the national levels, use in order to retain or gain power.

This collection provides a valuable analysis of socio-political change in Bangladesh over a period of almost twenty years. It is extremely interesting as a means of understanding how democracy failed to take root in the country, especially the role played by corruption in eroding the social foundations of good government.

Jaheruddin, A.R. A., Rural Development and Informal Coalitions in a Bangladesh Village. Dhaka, Agraha, 1987, 76 pp

A useful analysis of the rural power structure and the factors which determine the allocation of scarce resources in Bangladesh, this work throws considerable light on the circumstances under which patronage and patron-client relationships function at the village level. Originally a thesis that was submitted to Nijmegan University, Netherlands, by the author for his M. Phil degree, this book is based on field research conducted in 1982 at Salampur village in Mymensingh district.

According to this study, state organisations at the village level are appropriated and exploited by local leaders to strengthen their own position, both materially and politically. These leaders form coalitions in which they function as faction leaders, on the basis of allegiances that are tied to kinship and patronage. Patronage rests on relationships between patrons and clients, an arrangement which this work examines in some detail. In this relationship, patronage is the use of resources by a patron, who controls these resources, to assist or protect the client, who does not control the resources.

The author is convinced that the failure of rural development programmes in Bangladesh has its roots in this local power structure, in which local elites can regulate village affairs according to their wishes, recruit followers, uphold their control over formal institutions and reinforce social inequalities within the village.

The author compares the functions of village institutions as formulated by the state and their de facto functioning with the aim of assessing whether there are discrepancies between the two, and also to identify who benefits from the goods and services that are allocated to these organisations.

He discovers that generally, the state seeks to organise villagers and provide them with subsidies, through formal institutions, such as the Union Parishad, Gram Sarker, the managing committees of schools and so on. Local elites, such as money lenders attain control over these organisations and thus over money and goods flowing from official sources. These goods and subsidies create for local elites the opportunity to enrich themselves and /or their clients and followers. Since the informal leaders control the formal institutions, they are the ones who choose the beneficiaries of state subsidies and resources. Therefore, instead of bringing development to rural Bangladesh, the formal institutions strengthen the positions of the informal leaders both materially and politically giving them the opportunity to act as brokers between the villagers and the state.

In this context, corruption arises from various circumstances such as a scarcity of resources, as well as by the initiatives undertaken by the state. The main players in the rural context are local elites, informal leaders, money lenders, members or chairmen of local government institutions. The victims are the rural masses who cannot appropriate resources and who are forced to form coalitions with patrons in exchange for a share of resources.

Kochanek, Stanley A., Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh. Dhaka, University Press Ltd, 1993, 377 pp

It is not the primary focus of this work, but like many works on Bangladesh, this one also provides ample evidence of corruption. It is also one of the only works on the business community in Bangladesh. Consequently, the book is useful. However, there is one limitation: the author clearly subscribes to the ‘modernisation’ theory and as a result, the overall theme of this work must be approached with caution.

The author discusses and refers to a range of corrupt activities in virtually all aspects of public and private organisation in Bangladesh - from the practice of tadbir or personal lobbying, to fraud of various kinds in elections, business, trade and industry, political and social organisation. In other words, what emerges from this work is a pattern of ‘pervasive patronage and corruption’ (p. 341) by successive political regimes, in public administration, and in the internal and external dynamics of the business communities in this country.

The theme of this work - as indicated in its title - is to look at the dynamics of a special interest group, i.e. business, and how it has interacted with the patron-client ‘politics’ of Bangladesh. The argument presented is that patron-client politics are the key social element which, together with other socio-political traditions and so-called primordial conditions, impede progress in Bangladesh. Thus, the very texture of Bangladeshi society is seen to rest on an inherently corrupt socio-political arrangement, the patron-client basis of exchange.

This argument of systemic corruption is developed to show how Bangladesh ‘remains’ (p. 336) in an underdeveloped stage because of a range of negative social forces, which include, primarily the weakness of organised special interest groups such as the business community, to contain and challenge the distortions created by a factionalised, atomised, highly traditional polity and society. The work does not imply that special interest groups are the cause of the problem, rather it focuses on how, in the presence of deeply imbedded traditional ‘patterns’, weak institutions which do not operate on the principles of ‘collective action’ (p. 223) and which fail to adopt a ‘coherent business view’ (162) cannot contain distortions or ‘transcend primordial group loyalties’ to reach a ‘development consensus’ (p. 102).

A major aspect of this work is that the author subscribes to what the social sciences regard as the ‘modernisation’ theory. A body of work which emerged after the Second World War, modernisation theories basically perceive development as a transition from ‘tradition’ to ‘modernity’, a transition which has already been completed by the developed world and one which third world countries are in the process of achieving. In this theory, ‘modernity’ signals the end of social and political forms of organisation which are personalised, or patrimonial in nature, the inference being that these have been replaced in the developed world by more rational, ‘respectable’ (Theobald, 1990 p. 52) forms of organisation.

It is evident that Kochanek believes in this ‘evolutionary’ model, for he analyses the special interest business groups in Bangladesh from this basic premise, i.e that the developed world is an enhanced, sophisticated, sanitised, depoliticised and ‘clean’ version of the more personalised, authoritarian, corrupt institutions which exist still in the developing world.

It must be acknowledged, that whereas most works on political and social development in Bangladesh tend to focus on political parties, electoral activities and public administration as the primary players in this field, Kochanek examines the nature and workings of a secondary set of factors, namely special interest business groups. The focus of this book is therefore interesting and rare. The book provides a detailed, albeit largely anecdotal account of the business communities in the region now known as Bangladesh, touching on their history in colonial and Pakistan times, right down to the early 1990s, examining their internal dynamics on the one hand and how they interacted with external forces such as government policy, political change and socio-economic forces, on the other.

And notwithstanding the author’s ‘evolutionary’ interpretation of the causes of corruption, what emerges from this work reinforces the impression that civil society in Bangladesh is weak and hence cannot easily provide conditions conducive to transparency. These factors must be taken into account when devising measures to contain corruption. Furthermore, the potential of the private sector to take over any of the functions of the public sector and to do so in a transparent manner, under the socio-economic conditions which prevail, must also be realistically appraised. Kochanek’s volume manages to provide some of the background necessary to these deliberations.

Maloney, Clarence, Behaviour and Poverty in Bangladesh. Dhaka, University Press Ltd, 1991, (3rd edition), 93 pp

By the author’s own definition, this monograph is ‘necessarily rather subjective’, and is thus likely to be criticised as a ‘culturally prejudiced’ analysis of poverty and its causes in Bangladesh. This is a fair assessment, for the underlying bias of this work detracts from what might have been considered an interesting account of social organisation in Bangladesh, with particular reference to patron-client relationships and corruption. The author, an anthropologist by training, subscribes to the evolutionary or modernisation theory of development. In his view, the reason people in Bangladesh remain ‘so continually poor’, is because they possess innate cultural traits which are the product of an evolutionary process in which the Bangladeshis have adapted to their environment. From this line of thinking it follows that as Bangladeshis continue to evolve, they will achieve different levels of development until, presumably they have attained a desirable level of modernity.

Having said that, the author adds that it is only because they are measured by ‘modern’ economic standards that Bangladeshis appear to be poor. What he is trying to say, it seems, is that even if things seem dismal for Bangladesh, they are difficult to change because they are part of a ‘natural’, evolutionary process. After all, it is ‘the texture of society and human behaviour’ which determines what works for Bangladesh, Maloney says. And in the future, it is these very qualities which may come in useful for Bangladesh to survive.

The centrepiece of Maloney’s thesis is the predominance of poverty in Bangladesh and while discussing both informal and formal efforts to fight it, he examines several supposedly popular notions of the causes of poverty, such as the impact of colonisation, population, illiteracy and even the so-called propensity towards "idleness" amongst Bangladeshis.

A major characteristic of Bangladeshi society, according to Maloney, is its historic location as a frontier land which apparently prevented the growth of socially cohesive and settled communities. This, in turn, led to the development of a typical individualistic, atomistically driven personality. These characteristics apparently provide the foundation for a society marked by patronage, daya or indulgence, a highly personalised administration, and a high level of dishonesty and bribery. Western concepts of trust, guilt and duty, as well as notions of impersonal behaviour and sincerity are absent in this society which, because of a past reliance on traditional verbal agreements, cannot adapt to ‘modern’ concepts such as a written code of conduct which require the ability to read and write. In the context of this work, the nature and prevalence of corruption in Bangladesh is perceived to be the result of innate, inherent, largely cultural characteristics.

Given this bias, Maloney’s work offers a very narrow interpretation of the process of corruption in Bangladesh. It is significant that one of the few contemporary sociological studies of poverty in Bangladesh displays such a bias. It reinforces the view that modernisation theory continues to play a part in the discourse of development. The impact of a perspective such as Maloney brings to bear on the subject is potentially dangerous because it encourages inaction and negativity.The impact of this attitude is counter-productive to any realistic initiative towards combating the root causes of corruption in society and hence ought to be digested with caution.

Masood, Abdur Rahmanel, Durniti Daman Ain (The Anti-Corruption Laws). Dhaka, Published by A.K.M. Shafiqul Islam, 1993, 214 pp

This book is in response to a demand for a Bangla version of the Anti-Corruption Laws in Bangladesh and is thus fairly useful as a reference source in Bangla. In the preface to this book the author comments on the state of corruption in Bangladesh, stating that although the representatives of the people, together with public officials are all expected to perform their duties honestly, sincerely and impartially, the level of corruption shows no signs of abating. In fact, the undesirable tendency among the public servants to make money through bribery and corruption has increased to a greater extent than ever before. The author feels that people from all strata in the society should be aware of these laws particularly in view of these developments.

Public Servant, as defined in this work, includes the office of chairman and members of all representative bodies, all officers and employees in the services of the country, the chairmen, members, officers and employees of all financial institutions, local authorities, corporations, autonomous, semi-autonomous bodies.

It is clear from these comments that corruption is perceived as a growing threat which can be curtailed by public awareness of laws against its practice. There is also a sense that public service is regarded as a position of responsibility which must be discharged with ‘impartiality’. Finally, although public service refers to a select group of individuals, the legal aspect of corruption is considered to be relevant to the public at large.

Muhith, Abul Maal Abdul, Bangladesh Punargathon O Jatiya Oikamatta (Bangladesh Reconstruction and National Consensus). Dhaka, University Press Ltd, 1991, 284 pp

This book is a critical account of the government of H.M. Ershad, a period characterised by an all-pervasive level of corruption. Written by a former senior bureaucrat, who was himself a minister in Ershad’s government for a couple of years, the book carries a useful account of the happenings of that period, especially in the field of politics and economy.

According to this work, the high level of corruption during Ershad’s time was due to the manner in which he seized power. Ershad’s rule of nine years, from March 1982 to December 1990, was always regarded as illegitimate because the army general had seized power from a democratically elected government. Consequently, his government was in dire need of legitimacy and had to win support from key elements in the country. It sought to acquire all this through the liberal dispensation of patronage. Thus, Ershad’s policies and actions were aimed towards satisfying village elites, winning the support of business and industry, empowering bureaucrats, wooing politicians, and serving select sections and classes of society. The result was the wilful misuse and misappropriation of the public exchequer and public resources.

The work deals at length with Ershad’s tenure, describing how the top levels of government, including the head of state himself and his ministers encouraged corruption and how, to continue in power they created a class of collaborators, or elites, as well as brokers, or middlemen who helped support their control over the country. Among other ills, the non-payment of bank loans , the practice of nepotism and regular pay-offs to contractors and agents who participated in development projects became a hallmark of this time.

This work portrays a specific period in Bangladesh’s history which became virtually synonymous with corruption and the misuse of power. Ershad’s government is often used as an example of how the absence of democratic government perpetuates corruption on a very high scale and to that end, this book is an informative source. It shows how political patronage and the lure of economic advantage collaborate to maintain personalised governments and how these, in turn, interact with and influence social conditions and standards. The main actor in this scenario is the leader himself whose personal motives for seizing and remaining in power provide the conditions for corruption to flourish.

Novak, James J., Bangladesh: Reflections on the Water. Dhaka, University press Limited, 1993, 234 pp

An interesting, interpretative account of Bangladesh, Novak’s book contains a sociological perspective of this country from the point of view of a long-time resident who was also a member of the aid community. Novak’s association with Bangladesh has been both personal and professional. His brother, Richard was a missionary in Dhaka in the 1960s, dying tragically as the result of a stabbing incident in 1964. Novak first visited Bangladesh in the early 1970s, when he was working for a pharmaceutical company in Hong Kong. After leaving the business world, Novak became the Resident Representative of The Asia Foundation in Bangladesh, from 1982 to 1985. His son, Joseph, was posted to Bangladesh as a junior US Foreign Service officer in 1992, the third member of the family to have worked in this country.

The impact of Novak’s association with this country is best expressed in his own statement that, "for me, Bangladesh is a nation more loved than analysed." It is this perspective which ought to be kept in mind when reading his book, because there is a multitude of anecdotes and references, ideas and details which stem clearly from a long, personal and yet ‘foreign’ interface with Bangladesh.

The work begins with a somewhat rambling chapter entitled The Scene, which sets the tone for the rest of the work. The Scene comprises of a number of ideas, impressions and images: visitors, especially the ubiquitous ‘consultants’ who populate the posh hotels of Dhaka; the role played by aid in the country’s economy; traffic in Dhaka; the jute, tea and garment industries; other visitors who come for commercial reasons; crime and urban problems in Dhaka; a brief introduction to the history and geographical features of Bangladesh. In much the same vein, Novak deals with a wide range of subjects, arranged under the following titles:

The Seasons ; Pride and Poverty ; Aspects of the Bangladeshi Mind; I am the Cyclone: I Am Destruction ; Further Tales of Murder and Politics ; Bangladesh and the United States; Will Bangladesh Survive?

Although corruption is not discussed separately as a subject on its own, it forms a part of the narrative, particularly with reference to political changes and economic growth. Novak’s perspective, however, is undoubtedly influenced by modernisation theory because he interprets the features of Bangladesh in a terminology and a tone which are clearly ‘evolutionary’. For instance, he spends a fair amount of time discussing the ‘rusticity’ of Bangladesh - a characteristic he finds in both the physical as well as the mental attitudes of the people. The ‘evolutionary’ theme is reinforced all the time, by the liberal and unselfconscious use of terms such as ‘clannishness’, ‘primitive’ ‘consanguinity’ and ‘parochialism’ to describe and define the people of Bangladesh, which is fairly surprising. Even more surprising is his comment the people of Bangladesh not only live in a ‘state of nature’ but just as Thomas Hobbes declared, their lives are ‘nasty, brutish and short’.( p. 104)

There is no doubt that Novak feels close to Bangladesh and that his aim is to present a realistic portrait of Bangladesh, from his personal perspective. But the manner in which he presents his picture of the country leaves him open to criticism. The broad conclusions from this work are in many ways conflicting, with some aspects of Bangladesh being regarded as positive and others in a negative light. The result is to confuse the reader and, unfortunately, reinforce a somewhat exotic, objectified image of a people who are, in the final analysis, alien to the writer. Novak’s work can encourage the view that corruption is a cultural trait in Bangladesh, as innate as the propensity to live brutish lives and interact on terms which are parochial, clannish or primitive. For social scientists, this work reveals much about how even long-time residents of Bangladesh can remain entrenched in a particular point of view, even as they might be genuinely sympathetic and close to the country.

Siddiqui, Kamal, Towards Good Governance in Bangladesh: Fifty Unpleasant Essays. Dhaka, University Press Ltd,1996, 174 pp

This collection of ‘unpleasant essays’, as the title states, is of interest to the social scientist examining issues of corruption in Bangladesh because it throws light on the challenges faced by the bureaucracy, with special reference to the issue of ‘good governance’. The author, an economist and civil servant with other works on government and society to his credit, writes from his own experience in the bureaucracy which began almost three decades ago but which included, from 1991 onwards, a three-and-a-half-year posting as Secretary to the Prime Minister.

The essays in this collection were originally written as a column under a pseudonym for The Daily Star newspaper and though revised for this collection are still fairly anecdotal in style. The subject matter of the collection is the civil service and the dire need for reform to overcome the ‘bureaucratic crisis’ in the country, a crisis evidently of internal dynamics within the service, which has in a sense crystallised under the external pressure of ‘good governance’ imperatives imposed by the international donor community as a condition of continued assistance to Bangladesh. A key component of the new development agenda is a focus on transparency within the bureaucracy, with implications on the size of the service, the nature and scope of its activities and therefore also on its future identity as an institution.

From the tone and subject matter of this collection, what emerges is a picture of an increasingly beleaguered bureaucracy in Bangladesh. Siddiqui questions the motives of the ‘good governance’ agenda, arguing that unless it is ‘restricted to economic management’ (p. 17) it will be ‘gross interference’ in the country’s internal affairs, perhaps even a violation of its sovereignty.

It is clear that the bureaucracy is on the defensive because it fears losing its share of the spoils in a transparent administration, and also because of other implications which accompany the devolution of its powers to other (private) institutions in the country. It is evident that the ‘spoils’ theory alone cannot account for the bureaucracy’s reluctance to be downsized and lose its predominant position as the most influential institution in the country.

Behind the rhetoric there is a sense of genuine concern: Siddiqui’s comments highlight the fear that the interests of outsiders or donors may not be as altruistic as they are assumed to be nor, for that matter, are they necessarily more accountable than the government bureaucracy in the country. At the same time, there is no denying the fact that the civil service needs to be reformed. Siddiqui states that no matter what happens, the civil service has to put its own house in order, even if this means making government harsher, tougher and even somewhat terrifying. From this discussion it is evident that the civil service regards itself as central in any debate or discussion on good governance, transparency, accountability and corruption and feels that the bureaucracy must remain in control, at any cost.

The sections on factionalism and corruption provide ample evidence of this point of view, from recommendations to re-organise the Bureau of Anti-Corruption along the same lines as the armed forces, to extensive media coverage of exemplary punishment meted out to ‘big fish’ so that this may ‘strike terror in the hearts of officers and VIPs prone to corruption’(p. 26). Although Siddiqui mentions the need to take preventive measures to combat corruption, he makes no distinction between the moral and amoral implications of corruption and as a result his solutions, too, such as the ‘education of the community at large on corruption’ (p. 24) take on an overtly moral tone.

Since Siddiqui’s main aim is obviously a reform of the civil service, the sociological aspects of corruption appear in a largely incidental manner. Nevertheless, for social scientists, this collection offers valuable insights into the ‘culture’ of corruption. For instance, the political implications of a social exchange called tadbir (p. 26, passim) as well as the wide application of this form of ‘persuasion’ (if it might be defined in that way) in civil society in Bangladesh, throws light on a process by which corruption is virtually institutionalised. Another example is the ritual of ‘sirring’ (p. 10) the boss, which further indicates a process which establishes hierarchical patterns. There is also ample reference to the lack of political will in enforcing laws against corruption in the land, a common perception in Bangladesh but still a sign of increasing frustration and anger.

In the end, the book is striking because it reflects how deeply corruption affects civil society. Siddiqui’s anger, frustration and sense of insecurity are all evidence of a lack of confidence in the political and social order. It is also significant to note that the civil service itself feels challenged by standards which are essentially unrealistic because, as the author himself advocates, in order to abide by these standards a harsh, terrifying regimen will have to be invoked. Furthermore, it is also evident that the bureaucracy in Bangladesh feels it is entitled to govern; any move to force its abdication is likely to become embroiled in emotional considerations of its sovereignty. In the end, this work reinforces the view of the sociologist that an objective understanding of the processes by which corruption exists in bureaucracy, and thus within civil society, is essential in order to design solutions to it.

Theobald, Robin, Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment. London, Macmillan, 1990, xi, 191 pp

An examination of corruption from the perspective of development and underdevelopment, this work offers rich insights to the social scientist seeking a greater understanding of corruption and its relationship with social and economic forces in a third world country like Bangladesh. The work does not focus on Bangladesh as such but rather on developing countries. Nevertheless, it is a sound theoretical work which will throw light on major questions, issues, points of view which anyone exploring corruption in Bangladesh will have to tackle at some stage.

In the author’s view, corruption ought to be treated as an universal phenomenon which manifests itself in ways that vary with specific social and economic backgrounds. With this end in mind, the author looks at length at historical, social and economic changes which have informed the discourse on corruption largely but not entirely in the developed world, critically examining its theoretical underpinnings and its relevance to the underdeveloped world.

The author notes that at the core of contemporary notions of political and public corruption lies the ideal of a ‘rational-legal’ bureaucracy (p. 2 and passim) in which the state apparatus is characterised by neutral, impartial, impersonal, efficient, rational and secular procedures, remains impenetrable to political, social and economic self-interests, and is accountable for its actions to a mass electorate. The ideal of a ‘modern polity’ as conceptualised here is seen to have been already attained, in great measure, by the developed world. Furthermore, it is believed that if underdeveloped countries adopt similar goals and mechanisms, they will eventually reach the same evolutionary level of the developed world, a kind of ‘end-state of modernity’(p. 47).

The author argues that in reality things are different. Firstly, the developed world is far from attaining the ideal. He provides ample evidence of the existence of corruption at various levels in the developed world. Secondly, he examines how the notion of a corruption-free public service and the adoption of the so called ‘bureaucratic principle’ (p. 3) in the developed world is in reality the result of a historically specific set of circumstances. These circumstances were not, as is often assumed, an emerging social work ethic inspired by Protestantism and the cultural values which were informed by it, but rather the result of a ‘dramatic economic expansion’ in Europe (p. 151) from which, eventually, the masses were able to benefit.

Thus, far-reaching behavioural changes such as institutional growth, mass awareness, democratic and accountable norms of political and social organisation, came about together with capitalistic industrialisation. For the social scientist it is worth noting that it was evidently the ‘development of public accountability and awareness of its necessity, rather than some alleged diffusion of greater honesty’ (p. 152) in the developed world that eventually defined notions of public and political corruption.

A strong feature of this work is its dispassionate approach to corruption. The author accepts the reality that corruption is more of a problematic in the underdeveloped world than it is in the developed world. In the underdeveloped world it is the pervasive, imbedded, and often visible manifestations of corruption at routine levels of administration and political organisation, together with the fact that a chronic scarcity of resources imposes serious strains on citizens and the state, that makes corruption far more serious in its impact on human life and existence.

From this discussion arise a host of questions, such as why corruption exists in these varied forms, how each of these forms manifests itself and where each begins to impact on the notion of corruption, development and underdevelopment, all of which the author explores. The result is a fascinating and useful analysis of social, economic and political factors with which corruption inter-relates at various levels. These include patrimonialism both in the pervasive form in which it exists in the underdeveloped world, together with the ‘elite patrimonialism’ which is found in developed countries (p. 162),as well as patron-client relationships, the organisation of social groups along kinship lines, the role of patronage in political organisation, the impact of economic growth on political and social organisation.

Theobald examines corruption from both moral and purely functional points of view, focusing on suggestions to contain it. In the end, the author concludes that though some forms of corruption are useful, in the absence of any reliable means of measuring their impact, it must be accepted that corruption is undesirable and must be controlled. The introduction of mechanisms to limit the role of the public sector, without damaging the balancing role it plays in an underdeveloped society, are advocated, as our initiatives to promote the growth of civil society and institutions. On the whole, however, this work does not suggest easy solutions. In essence, it holds that corruption is so closely linked to underdevelopment that it is impossible to conceive solutions to the one without taking into account the other.

Umar, Badruddin, Bangladeshe Durniti Santrash O Noirajya (Corruption, Terrorism and Anarchy in Bangladesh). Dhaka, Prakritojan Prokashani, 1994, 97 pp

This book is an anthology of articles published in national daily newspapers and periodicals between 1991 and 1993. Among 21 articles, five articles deal with the subject of corruption.

As far as corruption in Bangladesh is concerned, the author compares and links corruption to terrorism and anarchy. There is a strong theme in this work about the criminality of corruption. Tracing the pervasive nature of corruption across diverse fields and activities in Bangladesh, the author states that not only has corruption grown to be much bigger in size and influence than it was ever before in the history of this country, but also it has become virtually socially accepted. With the level of social acceptance it has attained, it is more and more difficult to organise an effective movement against it in Bangladesh.

This work stresses the need to identify the real causes of corruption, especially in circumstances whereby corruption is widespread and deeply rooted. In such instances, the author feels that attributing blame on an individual is not correct. Corruption emerges under and is sustained by a specific set of socio-economic conditions and these conditions are the key to the eradication of corruption.

Wood, Geoffrey D., Bangladesh: Whose Ideas, Whose Interests? Dhaka, University Press Ltd, 1994, 583 pp

A collection of writings by a social scientist with more than two decades of experience in rural development in this country, this is one of the few works on the sociology of development in Bangladesh. Consequently, while the volume as a whole is devoted to a critical analysis of the development policy process, with special reference to rural development, two chapters in particular offer valuable insights into the discourse on corruption in this country.

In Exploitation and the Rural Poor, Wood analyses rural structures and peasantry from a post-modern perspective, arguing against the conceptualisation of rural institutions from the point of view of a standard, historically specific dichotomy of "traditional" versus "modern". The author traces the complex relationships of class, status and economic resources, arguing against the application of a universal model of development. In his view, the process of development consists of sui generis structural forms and it is the identification and analysis of these forms, within theoretical frameworks which forms the basis of much of his work.

In the essay, Parallel Rationalities in Service Provision: The General Case of Corruption in Rural Development, Wood reinforces his theme of sui generis structural forms, extending this to an analysis of the concept and context of state-society relationships in service provision, seen through an examination of the problematic of corruption. The paradox of corruption, he explains, is that even though it is increasingly acknowledged as a ‘generic feature of the relationship of official and society’ (p. 519) there is not much theoretical discussion of it. What there is tends to focus on several themes.

There is the commonly used sociological explanation of corruption as the outcome of a ‘clash of rationalities’ in which a patron-client, multi-transactional culture is seen to subvert or influence the model of a Weberian rational model. Wood agrees that there is a case for this so-called clash, in the sense that the Weberian model is both historically specific and also extremely difficult to transport to poorer societies. But what is moot in his view is that as a theoretical framework the ‘clash’ is essentially inaccurate because the comparison is being made between ‘reality and rhetoric’ i.e between ‘actual behavioural patterns on the one hand and ideal type propositions on the other’.

The significance of this difference becomes clear when Wood outlines his analysis of corruption in state-market relationships. The basic argument presented by Wood is that in development societies like Bangladesh, the scale of intervention by the state (or quasi-state) is extensive. Consequently, the assumption that increasing privatisation of public services will remove conditions for rent-seeking is inaccurate.

"The weakness not only of the private sector but of any morality for an imputed transparent market involves the state not only as a substitute for market allocations, but as a formal regulator of moral transactions. However, the state itself is not immune from transactional immorality. Indeed, the state itself increasingly performs as a market with prices for services becoming established not as an outcome of principled rationing, but of demand." (p.530)

Wood presents a ‘continuum of official rent-seeking conditions’, in which a ‘defaulting state, unable to control markets (is) itself thereby marketised’. (p. 530) In such a situation, the concept of a ‘clash’ of rationalities is irrelevant and what becomes reality is ‘parallel rationalities’ in which transactions within the so-called marketplace resemble those between state and client.

"Corruption in the state is, as it were, paralleled by the hidden operations of the market, and in most societies, they interact. Thus, although conceptually the state and market might be distinguished by policy rationing and price allocation respectively, actually the two principles of operation are interdependent and indeed prompt each other." (Ibid.)

According to Wood the conditions for rent-seeking are controlled by a key variable, namely ‘exit’. He speculates that societies are distinguished from each other, perhaps, by the opportunities which they have for exit into non-state provision of goods and services. Therefore, monopoly and exit go together. And "if monopoly implies absolute rent-seeking, with a continuum of relaxed oligopolistic forms shading into crowded, competitive markets and wide consumer choice, then the only alternative to paying such ‘rents’ is exit into no service at all." According to Wood, societies can be arranged along a ‘monopoly-choice’ continuum in this way.

What emerges in Wood’s analysis is an interventionist state involved in development activities on a very extensive scale. It is the predominance of the development state and quasi-state, argues Wood, which places Bangladesh at the "absolute rent-seeking" end of the continuum. According to Wood, it is only with this broad framework in mind that a realistic understanding of actual behaviour can be made. He argues that if we acknowledge corruption to be a "special case of general behaviour circumscribing state-society relations around service provision (articulated to a considerable extent through ‘projects’) then we can see that the notion of escape is meaningless since it would involve people opting out of their own society and ceasing to be social animals (i.e. human)." In such a scenario, corruption is a strategy, not an option.

Furthermore, corruption is therefore not merely a moral or ethical issue, prompted by concern over the diversion of public resources away from the poor towards the already wealthy, but a key factor in development since it "refers to a process of public expenditure allocation and concerns an important interface between state and society, between state and market, or more accurately a process of marketisation of the state in the provision of public services." (p. 533)

The understanding of corruption which Wood encourages leads to the realisation that the subject is relevant beyond the (justifiable) concern over misappropriation or misuse of scarce resources. What is significant for social scientists in particular is the relevance of corruption as a pattern of behaviour, together with its structures and codes, determining to a considerable extent how all public services are managed in absolute rent-seeking conditions. If it is seen that imperfect markets coexist in the same institutional space with imperfect official service provision, then it is also clear that people, even poor people, will obtain service in this complex structure. The degree to which they succeed depends on their ‘resource profile’, (p. 539) and what is important for development is to enable people to cope with the "real world of service provision rather than an imaginary one of transparent bureaucratic allocation curbing the unequal distributional outcomes of a general equilibrium market." (p. 540) According to Wood, this real world is a "complex and opaque place and the discourse of development administration does the poor no favours when it fails to recognise this." (Ibid.)

In essence, therefore, what Wood says is that the suggestion that privatisation of public services will remove rent-seeking conditions is based on the assumption that perfect competition will remove the scope for rent-seeking. Such an assumption ignores the reality in most countries, certainly in South Asia, which is of imperfect market conditions. In these societies, transactions within the so-called marketplace resemble those between the state and its clients, hence ‘parallel rationalities’. Furthermore, since the state (usually in a local form) remains an actor in the marketplace anyway, (through subsidies, projects, target allocations) the cultures of these two theoretically contrasted systems of allocation have actually merged, empirically. This seems to be an important way of understanding this ‘frontier’ in rural development administration, states Wood. In his view, it renders the ‘good governance’ conditionality hopelessly unrealistic to actually existing processes.

The essay on corruption is useful for social scientists trying to piece together a realistic and analytical appraisal of corruption in this country. Wood’s analysis underscores many of the problems related to this subject. Although adopted by the international development discourse as one of the key issues contained in the goal of ‘good governance, corruption is a problematic in more ways than one. In order to deal with it, the concept has to be defined before it can be applied to a particular context. The aim of social science, and in particular the discipline of political sociology, is to identify the structures, institutions and their characteristics so that solutions can be found for them. To that end, this book is a valuable addition to the literature on corruption in Bangladesh.


Articles in Journals and Collections

Bhattacharya, Haripada and Rahman Md Mizanur, Rajnoitic Biponon Paddhyati: Bangladesh Prosonge (Mode of Political Marketing: Bangladesh Perspective). Samaj Nirikkhon, No 52, May 1994, pp 38 - 50

This article identifies corruption within the socio-political sphere, but in so doing it brings to the fore an interesting thesis about the nature and causes of corruption. Essentially, the article argues that political action becomes corrupt when it loses the social values of "service to the country, patriotism", and becomes instead a "sellable commodity", influenced by marketing strategies and forces. The latter are seen to exist within the domain of a capitalist economy and it is in this domain that a commodity becomes the instrument of profit making. When politics becomes a mere commodity, the negative impact of these mechanisms is felt both in social terms, in the erosion of values, as well as in the loss of economic welfare of the people.

This article provides a wide-ranging argument in support of the above-mentioned thesis, with reference to general principles and arguments, as well as by discussing and analysing the track records of successive governments in Bangladesh. The entrenched nature of corruption is amply demonstrated, often with examples from other countries. For instance, in detailing the consistency with which political organisations have received pay-offs by industrialists, the authors quote India’s leading industrialist, G.R.D. Tata, as follows:

If you support the ruling party you get their sympathy and support in return. If you do not you are in trouble. Morals have no role to play in this game. They (political leaders) take money from us, that is true. What is more important right now is that the government is realising that they need us, and not just for elections funds. The principle is quite clear. You pay money to them, you will get everything you want: licence, growth.

Economic gain and the pursuit of power are seen as negative motives when pursued by political leaders. It is due to the primacy of these elements that political actions becomes a part of the capitalist marketplace which, in turn leads to corruption and loss of resources for the country as a whole. Marketing techniques are singled out for discussion as a form of distortion, the sum total of which is to pollute and obscure reality. Thus, marketing techniques allow politicians to dupe the general public and build their individual personalities and images.

The authors of this work clearly see a strong link between capitalist or free market mechanisms and the abuse of public resources. They view corruption as a by-product of a particular system, i.e. capitalism, which promotes the profit motive to the exclusion of higher, or more moral values. The latter are seen to be the factors which can combat corruption provided they are adopted by political leaders in Bangladesh.

Chowdhury, Sirajul Islam, Bangladesher Samaj: Ashir Dashaker Nirikhe (Society in Bangladesh in the Eighties). Samaj Nirikkhon, No 15, February 1985, pp 46 -95

This work is similar to other studies on Bangladesh in that it perceives corruption as a predictable outcome of the capitalist economy and the social system which apparently accompanies it. Corruption is closely identified with capitalism and the pursuit of wealth, the underlying argument being that without an ideological basis to promote the concept that wealth should be pursued, corruption would be eradicated.

A comprehensive analysis of Bangladesh society in the eighties, this article touches upon a broad range of topics from major political events to issues relevant to the economy, bureaucracy and other components of state and society. While keeping the previous decade in perspective, the author argues that there has been no basic difference between previous governments and the present one in that all governments have been driven by the need to maintain their own power, promote the interests of the bourgeoisie and encourage the growth of capitalism. If anything, the only difference has been the worsening of disparities and the increase in the level of discontent.

Listing the problems of the eighties as having witnessed further increases in population, unemployment, crime, corruption, extortion and oppression, this essay places the blame on the capitalist model. According to this essay, the disparities caused by capitalism would have been checked by the de-nationalisation policy in the country, but this led to financial anarchy and the incidence of irregularities in the banking system. All this was the result of the belief that wealth was seen as the most reliable and effective standard of position and prestige.

By tracing corruption in its various forms, amongst public officials, banks, the police, political parties, professionals and so on, the essay presents a picture of widespread and deeply entrenched distortions in the system. The president, too, is brought into the picture, with a quote attributed to him alleging the virtual institutionalisation of corruption within the country’s banking system.

In this essay, corruption is the result of specific circumstances, systems and ideological beliefs. It is perpetuated by people in positions of power and authority, to the detriment of the public at large.

Gupta, Manash Ranjan and Chaudhuri, Sarbajit, Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture: A Theoretical Analysis. Economica, vol 64, No 254, May 1997, pp 331 - 343

As its title states, this paper presents a theoretical analysis of interest rate determination on informal credit in agriculture when the supply of formal credit is rationed by the official of the formal credit institution.

Apart from presenting an alternative explanation for high informal interest rates, for which price and credit subsidy policies of the government are responsible, this paper suggests the existence of corruption where there is official control over resources. This idea is part of a larger picture suggested by other discussions on corruption, namely that corruption is a structural outcome of varying modes of control exercised by power-holders in rural society in Bangladesh. In the case of this essay, the mode of control is through the supply of credit and the official who disperses the credit has to be bribed in order to release the credit to its intended beneficiary.Corruption has a functional aspect but it goes beyond it too, in the sense that it incorporates the state (or the quasi-state) in the form of the formal credit official as a player in the marketplace.

Essentially, this paper seeks to show how the supply of credit from a formal source (controlled by a bank official) and an informal source (controlled by a moneylender) are inter-connected in that they can compete with or complement each other. The supply of formal credit to the farmer is controlled by an official who releases the credit upon receipt of a bribe. Although the official has no control over the formal interest rate which is administratively determined, the effective interest rate for formal credit incorporates the bribe and the official determines the bribing rate as well as the amount of formal credit to be disbursed. Contrasting this with the informal credit source, it seems that the moneylender, on the other hand, determines the informal interest rate. The author shows how eventually, the informal interest rate and the effective formal interest rate (incorporating the bribe) are equal in equilibrium.

For social scientists this paper has interesting insights, explaining the relevance of corruption in rural power and service provision where informal and formal mechanisms occupy the same institutional space. This perspective aids the social scientist’s understanding of corruption as a practice and a structural outcome, beyond its ethical and moral implications, so that realistic systems can be devised which enable the poor or the disadvantaged to access the resources available.

Hossain, Md Abul, Prosonga: Amlatantric Sanskriti O Bangladesh (Perspective: Bureaucratic Culture and Bangladesh). Samaj Nirikkhon, No 37, August 1990, pp 58 - 73

As its title indicates, this is an appraisal of ‘bureaucratic culture’ in Bangladesh, a culture which is seen to be rife with many different forms and levels of corruption. The author’s approach indicates a preconceived acceptance of so-called cultural traits. Therefore, while this work provides valuable insights into the existence of corruption in the public administration system, the underlying assumption of a bureaucratic ‘culture’ as such ought to be approached with caution.

In outline, the work attributes special characteristics to the bureaucracy in Bangladesh. The author holds that there are two kinds of administrative action in the bureaucracy: at the higher levels of public office it is described as being political in character, while at the lower levels administrative action becomes bureaucratic in nature. Administrative action as a whole, which means the conduct and behaviour of public servants at all levels, together with the conduct and behaviour of individuals such as people and politicians who interact with them, are regarded to be part of the country’s ‘bureaucratic culture’.

The components of this culture are fairly exhaustive in that they include a range of activities, from tadbir, a term given to denote the seeking of favours through satisfying an important person in cash or kind, to various forms of service extended to officials and people with resources at their command. The author describes tadbir in some detail, explaining that the practice is well known in the country’s bureaucratic culture, as well as by people in general because the ‘miraculous’ impact of tadbir is obvious to all.

Similarly, the author dwells on the subject of bribes in the bureaucracy in some detail, stressing the wide-ranging, insidious and acceptable nature of bribery in the country. He points out that those who receive bribes as well as those who give bribes are equally culpable and yet, this does not prevent bribery in the administration. The situation is so bad, that both sides continue in the illegal exchange with impunity and what is more, both sides continue to flourish in their respective fields. The giver of bribes receives the public service or resource in demand, while the receiver of bribes becomes affluent day by day. The extent to which bribery has become acceptable in society is illustrated by the fact that a public servant in a position of importance ranks highest among eligible bachelors in Bangladesh, because his potential to earn a little extra on the side is obvious. According to this article, bribery has become far more of a public and socially acceptable exchange than it was before, with negotiations taking place openly, and with families of officials often participating in the act.

This work provides evidence of rampant patronage, rent-seeking, clientelism, bribery, nepotism and other forms of corruption existing both within and radiating from the bureaucracy in Bangladesh. It touches upon the social impact of corruption, but it does not provide any reasons for its existence other than, as mentioned above, linking it to ‘bureaucratic culture’. In the final analysis, this work conveys the impression that corruption is a primordial characteristic of Bangladeshi society and corrupt practices are traits which flourish within certain cultures. For this last reason, the work ought to be treated with caution.

Hurtman, Betsy and Boyes, James, Bangladesh: Abhabgrasthader Jannya Shahajjya (Bangladesh: Aid to the Needy). Translated by Saeed-ur-Rahman, Samaj Nirikkhon, No 2, January 1980, pp 101 - 137

The problem of aid disbursement in Bangladesh has been a familiar theme in many works on development in this country. Experts have noted with concern that Bangladesh is virtually a chronic case of underdevelopment, unable not only to reach a level of sustainable development but also to absorb or utilise the assistance. A major challenge for aid disbursement is the seemingly entrenched level of corruption which appears to consistently prevent aid from reaching the beneficiaries who need it the most: the poor people of Bangladesh. The problem is, and has been for many years, to devise policy and programmes which will deliver aid to the poor. In spite of a great deal of effort, the end results have been difficult to come by. Development administration has been unable to contain corruption and, perhaps most significantly, to understand the nature and processes of corruption in Bangladesh, especially at the grassroots rural level for it is here that the majority of people live.

This article throw light on the dynamics of aid disbursement in rural Bangladesh and on the virtually endemic level of corruption which has challenged progress in Bangladesh ever since the country came into existence and massive amounts of external aid were first channelled into its economy.

The study traces how development plans were amended when it became clear that enormous amounts of aid to Bangladesh (approximately $1000 million annually in the 1970s) were not resulting in the alleviation of poverty. Instead, aid was being appropriated by a select group of people, all of whom held positions of power and controlled resources - from the topmost levels of government, right down to the rural leaders at the village level. As a result of the actions of this small elite group, very little aid actually reached the most needy.

This article cites examples of actual misappropriation and misuse of aid. For instance, the problem with project aid in the form of tube-wells in north-western Bangladesh. It was found that aid never reached the population at large because rural landlords had colluded with members of co-operative societies to allocate almost all the tube-wells to themselves. There are other examples in this study which reinforce the perception that much is wasted because of misuse and misappropriation of aid. The impact of corruption is clearly serious: the article focuses in some detail on the conditions which led to crisis of food and resources in 1974, when a hit Bangladesh and the fact that it was caused, not so much by real shortages in production, as it was by hoarding, smuggling, and misappropriation of resources by ruling elites. The authors point out how, during this time, the grant of a dealership was regarded to be an act of great political patronage because the pay-off from trade in the illegal market was so high. Although the famine of 1974 has long passed, there have been similar periods of rising graft in the country and it is clear that a high premium is still attached to certain contracts and concessions, and this in turn can be linked to pervasive corruption - from the lowest to the highest echelons of political power.

Although this work is a critical appraisal of aid distribution and delivery in Bangladesh and therefore not a study of corruption as such, it nevertheless provides a valuable analysis of the context in which corruption flourishes in rural Bangladesh. Scarcity of resources, the existence of a population which is predominantly poor, coupled with political changes and upheavals, provide an environment in which various forms of patronage, hoarding, smuggling, rent-seeking and bribery can survive. The impact on aid delivery is obvious, with reference to both the immediate and long-term programme and project design prospects.

Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Parliamentary Action to fight Corruption and the Need for International Co-operation in this Field (Resolutions Adopted by the 94th Inter-Parliamentary Conference). CAC News, Vol 3, No 3, November - December 1995

As the title suggests, this work consists of resolutions of the 94th Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) conference on corruption, held in Bucharest, in October 1995. The conference was attended by representatives of 129 national parliaments around the world including Bangladesh.

The resolutions published here highlight the serious nature of corruption world-wide, and in particular, in the third world. Although analysed from a global perspective, the resolutions highlight circumstances which are especially relevant to third world countries, including Bangladesh.

For instance, it is noted that corruption is a serious threat to the rule of law, the stability and security of societies and the fair distribution of resources since it undermines fundamental democratic values and institutions and jeopardises social, economic and political development and the enjoyment of human rights. There is concern about links between corruption and other forms of crime, particularly organised crime, terrorism, drug-trafficking, money laundering and other economic crimes at both national and international level.

Corruption is recognised to be a factor in changing societies and it is seen to grow ‘alarmingly’ with the liberalisation and globalisation of trade, the introduction of new technologies and the increasing role of multinational corporations in a rapidly evolving political and economic context.

The resolutions recommend measures to combat corruption, including the need to encourage public expressions against corruption, the growth of an independent media and the provision of security and protection for all those who strive to combat corruption.

In these resolutions, corruption is perceived to be on the rise across the world, and it is linked to rapidly changing circumstances, many of which are common across the world. Furthermore, it is believed that the existence of corruption can be threatened by the growth of democratic values, freedom of speech, civil society and the rule of law.

Jansen, Erik G, Interest Groups and Development Assistance: The Case of Bangladesh. Journal of Social Studies, No 59, January 1993, pp 55 - 66

The strategies employed by interest groups in Bangladesh to influence the type of development assistance that Bangladesh receives is, surprisingly, seldom reported. Surprising, because according to the author of this paper, a former deputy resident representative of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, (NORAD) in Bangladesh, the problem of understanding, assessing and coping with these strategies is one of the most important development issues in most aid-dependent countries. Jansen looks at this subject from his own experiences in Bangladesh, providing a range of examples to illustrate the nature of the problem and is implications for aid donors and recipients.

With examples gleaned from his own experiences in the country, Jansen relates how development aid is consistently influenced by a variety of subtle and not-so-subtle rent-seeking strategies - corruption, in different forms. He demonstrates how these strategies of corruption can alter the nature of development aid in Bangladesh, forcing donors to abandon certain projects, (such as the supply of a US$1.5 million navigational stimulator because it is totally inappropriate for the needs of Bangladesh), or set up ‘white elephants’ which are never utilised by the recipient, (like hundreds of health clinics which were set up apparently in the 1970s, but ended up as ‘empty shells’ because the only reason for their creation was to provide commissions for special interest groups).

Jansen stresses that the size of the ‘aid business’ is so big in Bangladesh that it has created an entire class of aid dependent elites, actively engaged in what sometimes ( such as in connection with the Flood Action Plan) turns out to be a ‘bonanza atmosphere’. For social scientists this is an interesting discussion because it points to the institutional existence of corruption in relation to development aid in Bangladesh. The author identifies a new community of elites, consisting of academics, consultants, contractors, who seek donor-funded development contracts in preference to engaging in domestic activities either because the former is more lucrative, consistent in its economic returns and/or it offers opportunities for rent-seeking. The donor-funded elite include ruling governments, (such as the regime of President Ershad,) as well as civil servants, politicians, members of the private sector, and international firms and their local agents in Bangladesh. Domestic policies in donor countries also have a bearing on the kind of development aid provided, which means that both the private sector and the government of a donor country are also players in this field.

Jansen’s work is interesting to the social scientist because, among other things, it identifies the social dimensions of corruption in a largely economic scenario, where development aid provides economic rewards for participants but becomes the basis for the growth of new social classes who expend a large part of their resources in the pursuit of aid contracts.

Quddus, Munir, Apparel Exports from Bangladesh: Brilliant Entrepreneurship or Spurious Success, in Ali, Ashraf et al (eds) Development Issues of Bangladesh, Dhaka, University Press Limited, 1996, pp 13 - 56

This critical review of the role of the entrepreneur in the success of the garment industry in Bangladesh is a reflection primarily of an economic perspective, but it is nevertheless useful for the social scientist as well. Entrepreneurship is a socio-economic activity entailing, among other things and to differing degrees, the application and ownership of particular cultural resources and skills, the taking of risks, the ability to engage successfully in activities of the marketplace including, activities which are illegal. Indeed, one of the so-called benefits of corruption is the encouragement of entrepreneurship (Theobald, 1990) and conversely, it is often alleged that the existence of traditional forms of social organisation such as kinship units and patron-client relationships inhibit the growth of business and entrepreneurship. Quddus’ subject matter is therefore interesting to sociologists exploring corruption in Bangladesh.

The author’s main aim is evidently to highlight the contribution of the garment industry and its entrepreneurs towards the growth of the private sector in Bangladesh and therefore, there is a great deal of detailed information here about the industry, it size, its remarkable growth, the pressures it has sustained, the areas in which it has triumphed, and so on.

Of particular interest to those interested in the subject of corruption, is the inclusion of this topic under the section marked Prominent Failings of the Garment Entrepreneur where, among other things, it is explained how garment manufacturers are players in various illegal activities involving their trade, primary among which is the ‘leakage’ of imported fabric into the domestic market. The tone and the terms used here are defensive, the implication being that although the garment manufacturer has become a major factor in the economic landscape of Bangladesh, the accusation of corruption in the pursuit of what is seen to be a purely business activity (as opposed to bribing the state which is commonly perceived to be corruption on the part of the state) erodes from any economic and/or social gains that have been achieved.

"Critics of the industry," writes the author, "who allege that the major source of revenue for the industry are the unearned rents from leakage of fabric for the industry, fail to explain why the industry has been sustained in its record-breaking growth over the years."

The question is moot, especially since it is also evident from this very article that the garment entrepreneur is also the victim of regulatory controls which it tends to resolve through corruption. The cost to a garment exporter of overcoming constraints placed by the bureaucracy and the financial sector, for instance, is high, with some industry leaders claiming it is as much as $100 million each year. Quddus does make the point that corruption permeates the activities of both the state and the entrepreneur, nevertheless, the defensive tone of the article reinforces the impression that rent-seeking by the business community purely for its own gain is seen as deviant behaviour in Bangladesh. It is interesting to note that the allegations of corruption against the garment industry tend to focus on those areas where the industry has been engaging in illegal activities in the marketplace, and not at the point of its contact with the state.

Rahman, Atiur, Gram Banglar Tout O Khomatar Kathamo: Subidhe Len-den Bishaye Ekti Matamat Jariper Phalaphal (Touts of Rural Bengal and Power Structure: Findings of an Opinion Poll on Bargaining of Advantages). Samaj Nirikkhon, No 28, May 1988, pp 75 - 102

This article highlights the existence of touts or intermediaries at the grassroots level in Bangladesh, with particular reference to the illegal appropriation of resources allocated by the state for the benefit of the rural poor. Based on the findings of an opinion survey, this article suggests that these brokers or touts appropriate more than 54 per cent of public money for their own use.

According to this report, a recent acceleration in development activities through state patronage in rural areas has been accompanied by an almost corresponding increase in the influence of touts or intermediaries. The ignorance and unfamiliarity of rural people with forms and procedures which are a necessary component of rural state patronage gives a few informal leaders the opportunity to capture the resources for themselves. According to this report, the brokers form linkages between the state and rural society and because of their growing influence and strength, they seem to be functioning as an informal institutionalised sector in rural Bangladesh.

Like several similar reports on rural power structure in Bangladesh, this suggests that corruption accompanies the increasing allocation of resources in an otherwise scarce situation. It also suggest there is a relationship between development activities, state patronage, and the rise of rural elites. Corruption becomes an acceptable mode of conduct in an environment which is dominated by a few rural elites who exploit the resources meant for the majority, or the victims of corruption.

Rahman, Atiur, Grameen Manusher Drishtite Khamata Kathamor Sawrup (Nature of Power Structure in the Eyes of Rural Peoples). Samaj Nirikkhon, No 29, August 1988, pp 22 - 58

According to this essay, the power structure in rural Bangladesh is conducive to corruption. The very word power is seen to imply "control over wealth and people". These conclusions are the result of a field study in which it was found that people look at power as the ability to exploit human resources, wealth and administration under the guise of political activity. Consequently, political activity is seen as a mere cover for the more lucrative business of acquiring wealth.

With reference to the circumstances of the late eighties, when this article was written, the author explains that while state power is in the grip of civil and military bureaucrats, a group of businessmen, loan defaulters and privileged politicians have formed an unstable coalition. They have combined their strength to exploit the rural masses, through a growing class of brokers or intermediaries. The activities of the state is adding to the situation, for while the state tries to bring rural Bangladesh under its control in the name of rural development and various relief programmes, these activities become the arena whereby rent-seeking, bribing and misappropriation of resources take place.

It is worth noting that this essay traces the political developments of the eighties against a backdrop of scarce resources and uncertainties of income faced by a majority of people in Bangladesh. It is this perspective which helps to explain why power is seen as a means of attaining wealth, and not as a means of empowerment of individuals or the people as a whole. In essence, this article reinforces the view that in a climate of uncertainty and limited resources, the need for public patronage is seen as being crucial for the survival of those who can access resources, build coalitions with the state, and this encourages rent seeking, bribery and other forms of corruption.

Rahman, Atiur, Rural Power Structure: A Study of the Union Parishad Leaders in Bangladesh. Journal of Social Studies, No 4, July 1979, pp 87- 119

In many studies on rural or local government in Bangladesh corruption features as a backdrop to the narrative. In other words, although corruption is not the main focus of the study, its existence and its predominance in the rural framework is self-evident. So, too with this essay which provides a revealing picture of the institutions and mechanisms which hold power at the local government level, with special reference to the identity and characteristics of the power holders themselves. It was written in the late 1970s when the failure of rural development programmes to deliver benefits to the poor had encouraged consideration of a "new strategy of rural development". In the years to come, decentralisation would become accepted as the new model for rural development, a critical factor being the assessments made at this time. Consequently, this study holds interesting insights for evaluation of the reasons why rural development fails to achieve targets, especially with reference to corruption and the dominance of a rural elite.

Rahman’s study shows how, over the years, a rural-urban coalition of elites has established its influence over the state apparatus and through various "linkages" at the local and national level, has been appropriating for itself a major share of public resources allocated for the rural poor. The rural base of this coalition is formed by the leaders of the Union Parishad, the lowest tier of administration in Bangladesh. As the author traces the historical, social and political context in which the Union Parishad elites have managed to establish and sustain their dominance in Bangladesh, it is clear that a rural elite or rural "conglomerate", made up of the richest, most powerful members of the rural community - of which the Union Parishad leaders form a majority - benefits the most from rural development programmes. It is also clear that the mechanisms or ‘linkages’ by which the leaders attain and maintain their position include a wide range of social, political and economic exchanges which are corrupt.

For instance, a major avenue of corruption extends from the urban centre and its rural functionaries, as successive national governments, and political parties, seek and obtain electoral allegiance from the rural leaders, in return for which they funnel funds and resources to the periphery. The leaders benefit in several other ways too. They are in a better position to take advantage of opportunities such as subsidies, and new technology offered by the government. By monopolising local socio-cultural organisations which function as springboards for local leadership, as well as by dominating village courts or "salish", they are able to block any attempts by rural poor to challenge them. They exert subtle forms of influence through connections by marriage, family relationships, and the advantages of their position to influence officials at the rural and urban levels.

Rahman presents a revealing profile of these leaders, highlighting their social status, marital and family ties, levels of education, as well as their economic status as owners of land, labour and capital. The picture which emerges contains valuable insights regarding the nature of corruption at the rural level in Bangladesh, with special reference to the social and political profile of the leaders who dominate the power structure. Studies like this contribute towards establishing a clearer context for the socio-economic conditions under which corruption exists in Bangladesh.

Sarker, Abu Elias, Who Benefits? An Empirical Investigation of Upazila Decentralisation in Bangladesh. Journal of Social Studies, No 55, January 1992, pp 1 - 19

The relationship of social factors to the existence of corruption forms an integral aspect of the sociology of corruption. The argument in this essay highlights this aspect with reference to local government in Bangladesh. At issue is the Upazila Parishad or local rural government policy introduced by the Ershad government in 1982. According to Sarker, this policy of decentralisation, while failing to achieve any of its avowed objectives such as giving ‘power to the people’ or achieving ‘relevant development’, actually resulted in opening up ‘new avenues of politics, patronage and graft’. According to Sarker, Bangladesh has a socially oppressive agrarian and political organisation whereby a rich, rural elite reaps the benefits of state-funded resources, as well as various kinds of development. In this context, the introduction of a policy of decentralisation does not achieve its stated objectives because it cannot contain the erosion of an oppressive class structure. Furthermore, the author argues that social and economic oppression is such that decentralisation offers new opportunities for rent-seeking and various form of corruption.

Examining and analysing different aspects of the Upazila adminstration, Sarker highlights the existence of a ‘hierarchy of interest groups’ which operates on a social structure of dependency relationships and extends from the very apex, the chairman of the Upazila Parishad who is frequently also a ‘rural tycoon’, right down to the sardar or local tout who extracts cheap labour from a rural underclass. He traces how the same ‘hierarchy of interest groups’ which operated before, continues to reap the benefits of the new system, the difference being that now corruption becomes rampant because it has new avenues of exploitation.

The Upazila ‘reforms’ were brought in by the military dictatorship of H. M. Ershad, and a political agenda of establishing links with a rural base were implicit aims of the policy, but Sarker’s argument does not focus on this aspect except in passing. Nevertheless, this essay illustrates the link between social forces and corruption, specially with reference to devolution or decentralisation.


Research Reports and Working Papers

Abdullah, Abu and Murshid K.A.S., The Distribution of Benefits from the Public Food Distribution System. Dhaka, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 1986, 59 pp

Although this report is not an analysis of corruption, it provides an overall impression of the existence of corrupt practices within a large public food distribution network in Bangladesh.

The report itself is the result of a research project which was carried out by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies to estimate the benefits accruing to the recipients of the food-grains distributed through different channels (e.g. statutory rationing, modified rationing etc.) of the Public Food Distribution System (PFDS). The major objectives of this system were to guarantee a minimum quantity of food-grains at controlled prices, together with the provision of relief, to the rural poor.

There are specific references to the misappropriation of food-grains. For instance, referring to the system of "Modified Rationing", it is reported that there were "widespread allegations of misappropriation by the Union Parishad functionaries in collusion with the Inspector. The general impression gained from the field-work is that very little of the foodgrain reaches the intended beneficiaries."

The report further states that the evidence clearly shows that there have been few positive results from different methods of rationing. "Benefits to consumers appear marginal, and also seem to be accruing to the relatively well-to-do. Modified Rationing seems to be even more subject to corruption and abuse than Statutory Rationing."

In essence, the report stresses disparities in distribution within the PFDS, but in so doing it highlights the existence of corruption at the local government level in Bangladesh, with specific reference to the role played by local elites and officials in consistently appropriating resources meant for the poor.

In this discussion, corruption is perceived as a hindrance to the equitable distribution of resources; the main actors are local officials and elites; the victims are the "intended beneficiaries" or the general rural population. The existence of corruption appears to be related to the allocation of scarce resources.

Alam, Bilkis Ara (ed), Union Parishad : Kayekti Samikkha (Union Council: A Few Studies). Dhaka, National Institute of Local Government, 1983, 186 pp

This is a report based on field studies conducted under the direction of a public body, the National Institute of Local Government, on the functioning of the Union Council in Bangladesh. The Union Council, which constitutes the lowest tier of local government in Bangladesh, operates at the grassroots level and is thus considered to be an important institution with reference to the state and civil society.

The terms of reference of this study are fairly general. Consequently, references to corruption appear incidental to the main narrative, which records and discusses a range of Union Parishad activities in detail. Nevertheless, the existence of corruption emerges as a recurring feature of the rural structures under examination.

For instance, a study of the management of rural markets of the Kumira Union Council in Chittagong indicates that toll charges accrued from this source are misappropriated by the collectors. The same study also records that the official or chairman of the Union Parishad cannot account for the funds he has been entrusted with. Similarly, another study into a Food-for-Work programme of the Char Hazari Union Council in Noakhali district suggests that the project giving wheat in lieu of work is prone to misuse and corruption.

The findings of this field investigation apparently represent a number of common characteristics of Union Councils in Bangladesh. As a result of the matter-of-fact style of its narrative, as well as because of the detailed information of grassroots activities which it conveys, this study provides a picture of recurring misuse of public office and public resources at the lowest tier of government.

Consumark Limited, Bangladesh: The Regulatory Maze - and how it helps perpetuate poverty and corruption (Five papers prepared for the World Bank Resident Mission, Bangladesh). Dhaka, undated

A confidential report comprising five papers written after extensive field work in 1994-95, this document holds a wealth of information on the practice and processes of corruption in Bangladesh. The papers examine in great depth what is seen to be a "maze of regulations which act as an umbrella for corrupt practices" (Foreword) in the country, specifically in the interface of the state and the market.

In the five Papers, namely: 1) Nature and Characteristics of Regulation, 2) Cost of Doing Business in Bangladesh, 3) Exporting an Agricultural Produce and 4) Rickshaw and Rickshaw Operator Licensing, the author presents a strong case to drastically curtail the regulatory role of the state in order to contain corruption, allow business to function more freely and also maintain the required standards of quality and safety.

The data in this report are extremely valuable for any exploration of corruption in Bangladesh, but especially significant for the social scientist trying to assess the process of corruption and its structural characteristics. Having said that, it must be noted that the underlying rationale of these five papers, namely that regulations are the tool through which government graft is allowed to flourish in this country, needs to be further debated and discussed. While regulations are one significant tool through which governments and other power holders become predatory or extractive on the rest of the population, it is not accurate to attribute all ‘blame’ for corruption on regulations, as such. Indeed, social science would rather encourage the notion that regulations are symptomatic of more pervasive, wide-ranging and complex reasons for the existence of corruption and that the latter need to be addressed in order to devise solutions.

The assumption that reducing the activities of the state will automatically result in efficiency, transparency and accountability is difficult to accept, as are some of the solutions or alternatives which are suggested. The implication is that by removing the state, processes will become simple, transparent and less ambiguous, in general. Thus, the Paper on Rickshaw Licensing suggests that rickshaw licensing rules ought to be "drastically simplified" (Paper 1, p.11) and licences for rickshaw maliks ought to be made available through the post office, not the relevant government agency. Also, that renewals for licenses ought to be for a longer period. Furthermore, obtaining the license via the postal system ought to be offered as an option to the rickshaw malik, thus freeing him from the insidious hold of government regulations.

Why these amendments would remove the opportunity for rent-seeking is not at all clear. Given the reality of Bangladesh in the sense that resources are limited and in the case of rickshaws, for instance, there is a high demand for licences but a limited number of available places in the crowded city of Dhaka, the assumption that a private agency would not extract a fee equal to the bribe now being extracted is difficult to understand. Furthermore, it is even more difficult to decide exactly how the ‘new system’ would be standardised or prevented from being misused. Or, for that matter, how the procedure of mailing licences through the postal system would remove the option for rent-seeking.

Nevertheless, even with these limitations, it must be noted that it is the very thoroughness of the accounts in this document which, overall, make it extremely useful to social scientists. An understanding of the processes of corruption from a sociological perspective is important in order to design and implement policy and the data available here are rare for Bangladesh and valuable to launch further investigation and research. Scholars of all disciplines will find the research extremely stimulating.

Rahman, Md. Moksudur, Problems of the Village Court - A Case Study of two Union Parishads of Pabna Upazila of Rajshahi District. Rajshahi, 1986, 187 pp

The findings of this research report on the workings of a village court in rural Bangladesh indicate a breakdown in the rural justice system which is directly attributable to corruption at the lowest tier of local government. The report finds that the members of the village court, comprising the chairman and four members of the Union Parishad, together with rural elites, consistently influence decisions in favour of themselves and other local leaders.

The research project sought to identify the actual role of the village court in dispensing justice, the problems it faced, the level of confidence it inspired in the village people and ultimately, to suggest solutions to problems. Covering a period from 1976 to 1984, the research included interviews with a cross section of the village, including people who had direct dealings with the court such as plaintiffs and defendants, village residents, Upazila level officials, and Upazila level practicing lawyers.

The cross section was asked a series of questions about the neutrality of the court, whether judgements were biased in favour of rural leaders and whether rural elites influenced judgements in their own favour. The responses indicated that a majority of villagers felt that the village courts were not neutral and that elites influenced the court in their own favour.

This work is useful because it documents one of the most important functions of the local government, namely dispensing justice and protecting the rights of all residents. The picture which emerges from this account indicates the existence of a biased local government, prone to corrupt practices and unable to protect the rights of a majority of the villagers. The report attributes corruption and bribery among the chairman and members of the Union Parishad to be "the main causes for the failure in the administration of justice". Furthermore, this assessment is based on the views of the villagers themselves, which indicates that largely because of the entrenched nature of corruption, there is little public confidence in the administration of justice at the local level of government in Bangladesh.

Alam, Mustafa Muhammed, Huque Shafiqul Ahmed, Westergaard, Kirsten, Development through Decentralization in Bangladesh: Evidence and Perspective. Dhaka, 1994, University Press Limited, pp 107

A recent, well-researched work on local government in Bangladesh, this book is a valuable addition to the literature on rural society, especially in the context of decentralisation of local government. The book is not about corruption as such, but it reveals a great deal which is of relevance to corruption and social organisation.

Devolution or decentralisation of local government implies a greater participatory and social component to development and this, in itself provides a sociological perspective to this subject. The study presented in this book is based on a survey of four upazilas in the districts of Patuakhali and Barguna in 1990. The upazila was a tier of local government introduced in 1982 by the martial law government of General H. M Ershad. Although abolished in 1990, the Upazila Parishad reform is still relevant because it highlights a series of changes at the local rural level which could have succeeded in bringing about a more equitable distribution of power at the village level.

This work critically examines the salient features of the reform, revealing in the process the key weaknesses in its conceptualisation and design, namely, a lack of political and financial autonomy for the local people. The authors state that as a "decentralisation model, the Upazila Parishad is best characterised as a limited form of devolution, where the decision-making authority was transferred to legally incorporated local governments. At the same time, the local governments were not completely autonomous, neither politically nor financially. The central government had ensured a wide measure of control over their policy-making and the Upazila Parishads were financially dependent on the central government." (p. 92)

Although the stated objectives of the reform included the improvement of the socio-economic condition of the general people and their involvement in the decision-making process, the Upazilas did not achieve this objective. The poor were not represented in the local bodies, they were not involved in matters of project selection, and there were no discernible improvements in their socio-economic conditions.

The authors point out that political aims in rural reform have to be taken into account. Thus, it is clear that Ershad’s move was prompted as much by development trends- which have increasingly favoured decentralisation as a means of improving government performance and as a more efficient tool for development - as it was by his need to legitimise his military rule. Like other political parties in power before and after him Ershad, too, aimed to use the local government for political motives. Nevertheless, the reforms were significant in that the Upazila Parishads were made the focal points of local government. Prior to this time, the thana had been the main level of local government. These were first upgraded, into Thana Parishads and then renamed Upazila Parishads and reconstituted as representative bodies.

Even with the political objectives implicit in the reform, the initiative could have benefited the rural poor. That they did not clearly points to the continuing importance of social structures and the relevance of designing programmes which involve the poor. In the absence of this understanding, development will not be able to overcome the obstacles posed by the patron-client relationship. Even NGOs which enter the field will be forced or encouraged to perform as (new) patrons bringing with them access to external resources.


Bibliography

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Adams, Patricia, Odious Debts, Loose Lending, Corruption and the Third World Environmental Legacy. London, Earthscan, 1991

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Ahmed, Moudud, Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Dhaka, University Press Ltd, 1983

Akhter, Muhammad Yeahia, Durnitir Swarup Onneshon: Bangladesh (Search for the Nature of Corruption: Bangladesh). Dhaka, Nibedon Printers and Publications, 1991, This work shows a most definite tilt towards

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Ali, Sayed Tosharaf, Nirbachito Rajnoitic Column (Selected Political Writings). Dhaka, Al Amin Foundation, 1994

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Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, Who Gets What And Why, Resource Allocation in a Bangladeshi Village. BRAC Prokashana, September 1986, (2nd edition),

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Appendix I

TI - Corruption Perception Index 1997 *

Rank  -  Country  -  Score’97  -  Score’96  -  Variance’97

  1. Denmark  -  9.94  -  9.33  -  0.54
  2. Finland  -  9.48  -  9.05  -  0.30
  3. Sweden  -  9.35  -  9.08  -  0.27
  4. New Zealand  -  9.23  -  9.43 0.58
  5. Canada  -  9.10  -  8.96  -  0.27
  6. Netherlands  -  9.03  -  8.71 0.23
  7. Norway  -  8.92  -  8.87  -  0.51
  8. Australia  -  8.86  -  8.60  -  0.44
  9. Singapore  -  8.66  -  8.80  -  2.32
  10. Luxembourg  -  8.61  -  -  -  1.13
  11. Switzerland  -  8.61  -  8.76 0.26
  12. Ireland  -  8.28  -  8.45  -  1.53
  13. Germany  -  8.23  -  8.27  -  0.40
  14. United Kingdom  -  8.22  -  8.44 1.43
  15. Israel  -  7.97  -  7.71  -  0.12
  16. United States  -  7.61  -  7.66 1.15
  17. Austria  -  7.61  -  7.59  -  0.59
  18. Hong Kong  -  7.28  -  7.01  -  2.63
  19. Portugal  -  6.97  -  6.53  -  1.02
  20. France  -  6.66  -  6.96  -  0.60
  21. Japan  -  6.57  -  7.05  -  1.09
  22. Costa Rica  -  6.45  -  -  -  1.73
  23. Chile  -  6.05  -  6.80  -  0.51
  24. Spain  -  5.90  -  4.31  -  1.82
  25. Greece  -  5.35  -  5.01  -  2.42
  26. Belgium  -  5.25  -  6.84  -  3.28
  27. Czech Republic  -  5.20  -  5.37 0.22
  28. Hungary  -  5.18  -  4.86  -  1.66
  29. Poland  -  5.08  -  5.57  -  2.13
  30. Italy  -  5.03  -  3.42  -  2.07
  31. Taiwan  -  5.02  -  4.98  -  0.76
  32. Malaysia  -  5.01  -  5.32  -  0.50
  33. South Africa  -  4.95  -  5.68 3.08
  34. South Korea  -  4.29  -  5.02 2.76
  35. Uruguay  -  4.14  -  -  -  0.63
  36. Brazil  -  3.56  -  2.96  -  0.49
  37. Romania  -  3.44  -  -  -  0.07
  38. Turkey  -  3.21  -  3.54  -  1.21
  39. Thailand  -  3.06  -  3.33  -  0.14
  40. Philippines  -  3.05  -  2.69 0.51
  41. China  -  2.88  -  2.43  -  0.82
  42. Argentina  -  2.81  -  3.41  -  1.24
  43. Vietnam  -  2.79  -  -  -  0.26
  44. Venezuela  -  2.77  -  2.50  -  0.51
  45. India  -  2.75  -  2.63  -  0.23
  46. Indonesia  -  2.72  -  2.65  -  0.18
  47. Mexico  -  2.66  -  3.30  -  1.18
  48. Pakistan  -  2.53  -  1.00  -  0.47
  49. Russia  -  2.27  -  2.58  -  0.58
  50. Colombia  -  2.23  -  2.73  -  0.61
  51. Bolivia  -  2.05  -  3.40  -  0.86
  52. Nigeria  -  1.76  -  0.69  -  0.16

A number of countries that were on the list last year were left off this year because of insufficient data. These include:Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, and Uganda.

* Source: USIS News, Washington, July 31, 1997