Just as it is impossible not to taste honey that one may find at the tip of one’s tongue, so it is impossible for one dealing with government funds not to taste, at least a little bit of the King’s wealth. (Arhtashastra by Kautilya, circa 300 B.C.)
This was Kautilya’s India to which we all belonged and whose legacy runs down to the beginning of the new millenium. Corruption has been in this world since time immemorial. It is like a hydra-headed monster, that multiplies itself in a fleeting scale of time, from the ancient days of Kautilya to the present. The form and character of corruption changes over time. Time and again authorities tried to combat this artful skill by devising rules and systems to contain it including punitive sanction against perpetrators.
In this paper I shall give an outline of the inherent causes for which a strong accountability in the discharge of public services could not firm up in South Asian region. I shall also try to establish how lack of effective accountability in governance results in blighted growth of institutions, resulting corruption precipitating in all walks of life. I will focus, however, on my own country, Bangladesh. A major portion of the paper dwells on developing a framework for an effective anti-corruption agency in Bangladesh. The Bureau of Anti-Corruption has tarnished itself and has little credibility and it is hoped that the proposed reformed organisation offer the silver lining behind the dark clouds that engulf our lives.
Definition of Corruption:
For the purpose of this article ‘Corruption involves behavior on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by misuse of public power entrusted to them’’.
A regression analysis done by TI in 1997 (please see Annexe-1) established the hypothesis that the higher the GDP/Capita, the lower the corruption level and rates Bangladesh as the most corrupt of selected Asian countries. Klitgaard’s famous equation defines corruption as : Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability. The Transparency International analysis strengthens the argument that policies to promote economic growth and development are a key component to a long term anti-corruption strategy while Klitgaard’s equation emphases lack of Accountability (and Transparency) as major causes of corruption. Whatever may be the causes of corruption the fact is that Bangladesh like other regional countries is a country with unacceptable level of corruption and that corruption must be effectively combated.
Accountability in Governance in South Asia
Accountability is the most important of the three attributes of good governance. It must also contain the elements of being transparent and participatory. Major South Asian countries have in their hindsight 200 years of colonial rule. The East India Company with a charter from the Crown, was a profit seeking enterprise. They initially entered as a trading company but later through deceit, craft and treachery consolidated themselves as the rulers of India. Good governance and its corollary, the accountability criterion, that evolved over thousand years of rule in metropolis Britain was not established in British colonies nor was it meant to be. Profit was the prime motive of Company Directors, not designing an effective altruistic administration for the people of India.
The establishment of schools and colleges (unlike the Dutch in Indonesia), the development of infrastructure – the roads and the railways were aimed to roll over the raw materials from India to feed the fledgling factories growing under the impact of Industrial Revolution in 19th century Britain. The smallest administrative unit they deployed was the thana (police-station) headed by by a policeman as officer-in-charge. A careful observer can easily extract essence of their administration. Revenue collection and policing were the cardinal functions of their governance. The Deputy Collector, who was in charge of revenue collection was also the head of the district administrative unit while officer-in- Charge of the Thana was responsible maintaining law and order. Due to paucity of white officers (which never increased more than 5,000 at any point of time) they picked up local cronies awarded them Diwani, initially on annual basis but later on permanent basis from 1783. The Zamindars, as they were called could maintain an sizable number of persons to ensure tenants’ obedience and payment of annual revenue. The bigger princely states helped perpetuate British interests by providing men and money to prop up the British rule in India in times of expansionist campaigns and rebellion against the Raj. This type of administrative synthesis mechanically kept accountability outside the system of administration.
The Government of India Act 1919 was and eyewash of indigenous rule. The Government of India Act. 1935, promising a potentially effective parliament, offered some modicum of accountability in the discharge of public service by the holders of authority. It could not achieve much as more destabilizing events of war shifted the focus and the British, in desperation, were calling the Indians to unite and resist the axis power. In return they promised independence of India. Independence was given but the British left a half-baked parliamentary institution at the center and provinces.
Poor Bangladesh have more to say. It had the misfortune of subjecting itself to a second wave of discriminatory and oppressive rule for 25 years when it emerged as the eastern wing of Pakistan Since independence we had quite a few episodes of military rule which hung up the parliament, dislocated civil administration and hurt the process of institution building. Some form of continuity in democratic institution is evident since 1991, but equally evident is the lack of commitment for nurturing and sustaining a true democratic tradition and heritage. This is the sad saga of South Asia in terms of governance in which accountability was a far cry.
Outline of a Proposed Anti-corruption Organisation
In respect to combating corruption some division of labour is suggested between the proposed Anti-Corruption Commission and the Ministries. The ministries should supplement some of the work of combating corruption. Because the proposed set up for the Anti-Corruption Commission will be much smaller it will not be able to deliver effectively if it has to take the full load of the work.
The secretaries of the ministries/divisions should be given the primary responsibility of preventing corruption and dealing with cases of corruption taking place in ministry, departments and directorates under them. Actions will be taken as per a revised Government Servants’ Disciplinary and Appeal Rules in place.
The Ministry set-up:
1. Preventive Measures:
An effective Internal Control System should be in place at ministries/divisions which will suggest change in work practice and oversee that control procedures are strictly followed. This may include the following measures:
In Singapore when People’s Action Party came to power, the permanent secretaries were requested to take measures stipulated above and as a the result corruption scaled down significantly. Anti-corruption Commission should be smaller in scale. To downsize the anti-corruption agency in Bangladesh and to make it efficient, smaller offences must be encouraged to be handled by the Ministries/Divisions while ‘grand corruption" –which are by definition the preserve of top officials, frequently involving multinationals --- should be the main focus of the proposed Anti-Corruption Commission. Divisional and District level anti-corruption offices should be done away with.
2. Investigative Measures:
An effective unit should be established to carry out investigation on apparent cases of corruption. Qualified and experienced persons, having appropriate law training to handle cases, should man it.
Cases requiring departmental actions will be resolved by the Ministry and when other legal actions are deemed appropriate, the cases may be referred to Anti-Corruption Commission.
The head of the Internal Control Unit will report directly to the Secretary of the Ministry / Division.
On the one hand, the secretaries of the ministries should be given wider power to handle their delinquent and corrupt officers and staff within the ministry or in departments under their control. On the other hand, message has to be sent across to the secretaries and other senior officers about the serious efforts of the government to eradicate corruption from the administration and a reassurance from the government that they can count on non-interference of the government. The secretaries, in turn, will have to be more vigilant in respect of irregularities taking place within his ministry. The empowerment of the secretaries to punish corrupt practices and infringements would also entail responsibility of ensuring discipline. Within their ambit they will be failing if perpetrators go unpunished due to their laxity. The Anti-corruption Commission, which will also oversee this activity of the ministries, may issue strictures to the ministries in such cases and ministries performance in curbing corruption reflected in the (annual or occasional) Report to be submitted to a Parliamentary Committee on Corruption to be formed.
Proposed Anti-Corruption Commission:
The proposed Anti-Corruption Commission should be steered by an independent Commission not answerable to the executive branch of the government. It will be an office under the parliament to whom it will report annually.
Its constitution:
The Anti-Corruption Commission will consist of 7 members, headed by Chief Commissioner. There will be 4 full-time members and 3 part time ex-officio members in the Commission. The President will appoint the Commission members. The full- time posts will be tenured for 5 years. The President with the approval of the Parliament can only remove the commission members. The Commission will hold meeting at least once a month.
The full-time members will be:
The three ex-officio members are:
The Commission will have a relatively small office with multi-disciplinary professionals having expertise of investigating corruption cases referred to them by various ministries. They will also oversee the performance of the ministries / divisions in respect of prevention of corruption and also prompt handling of corruption cases.
Functions of the Commission:
The Commission would have 3 main functions :
The Independent Commission to Combat Corruption (ICAC) in New South Wales, Australia, roped within its functional ambit both preventive and curative measures against corruption. ICAC of Hong Kong devised similar public education programmes to minimise corruption.
But while enjoying independence and broad investigative power, the Commission :
Annual Commission Report to a Parliamentary Committee:
A parliamentary committee on corruption composed of members of Parliament from both treasury and opposition bench will be constituted. The Commission will be required to submit an annual report to the Parliamentary Committee highlighting the activities of the Commission in terms of (a) curative measures e.g. investigation, prosecution (b) preventive measures e.g. suggesting work procedures that will scale down corruption and also educating people and the public servants which would generate deterrence from adopting corrupt practices.
Sanctioning Power of the Commission:
The Commission shall have full power, after conclusion of an investigation against an officer of any rank, to decide on the basis of its findings, if the case be squashed or referred to department for departmental action or be sent to a court of law. The mandatory requirement of taking clearance from the PM’s Office before sending a case of middle to senior level officers to a Court of law should go.
An explanation is suggested why it should go. The Commission, as suggested would include 3 senior members of the civil service including the Principal Secretary to the PM and Cabinet Secretary (head of the civil service). If that Commission recommends a case to a court of law, there is no reason why it should again go through the PM’s Office. The routing of the cases through PM’s Office only causes delay to the whole process. The protection afforded to the Government servants by this system is undue and helps delinquent government servants to be arrogant. They tend to put a fairly heavy reliance to this anchor. If an independent commission is convinced from its findings, that the accused officer did perpetrate actions for which his case should be handed over to a court of law, there should not be any more mechanism to protect him from justice. Not infrequently, accused government servants find politicians’ support rally behind them and manage to extricate themselves from the cases. This defeats the whole process of fighting corruption and the essence of bringing criminals to justice, be he a government officer or an ordinary citizen.
Standard of Investigating Officer:
The investigating officers in the Bureau of Anti-Corruption are called Inspectors, who rise from ranks, sometimes even from constables. They are unskilled, usually drawn in from police, which has already tainted itself as the most corrupt department in a survey conducted by Transparency International recently. They very often use their office to harass other public officials, extort money from them, threaten them to rope them in an anti-corruption case etc. They are posted in the HQ are also in District Anti-Corruption Office.
It is suggested that investigating officers should be drawn in from various departments, not below the scale of senior scale officers. They should be appropriately trained in matters of civil and criminal law. The skill brought from the service in which they are borne, would give added skill in the pursuit of carrying out inquiries and investigation.
Persons who will be seconded to the Commission must be widely regarded as officers of integrity. This is being suggested because there is an almost emphatic outcry against the Inspectors of Anti-Corruption, from persons interviewed both from civil society (e.g. Transparency International) and from the Bureau itself.
Commission for Criminal Justice:
A recent Transparency International Bangladesh Chapter survey established police department as the most corrupt department in the country. That the law enforcing agency in Bangladesh is the most corrupt department is nothing new. The ICAC of Hong Kong was in fact a response mainly against the excesses of the Police in the 1950s and 1960s. In Queensland, Australia, a Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) had to be established through Criminal Justice Act of 1989 to restore confidence among the people against police illegal activities and misconduct. A very interesting statement was made in the report of CJC which is painfully true for Bangladesh, and I guess for all the countries, mooting this seminar:
Protecting the citizenry from the highhandedness of the police and other law enforcing agencies, and considering the TIB findings of police being the most corrupt department in Bangladesh, justify all the more the necessity of overhauling the Bureau of Corruption. The Bureau is generally manned by personnel on secondment from police (before 1966 the Bureau was directly under Police Department). One cannot expect impartial and reliable investigation report from them.
In Bangladesh allegation against police corruption, misconduct, harassment, death in police custody is a common feature and the police department failed to check misuse of powers by police personnel. Reality is people have lost confidence in police and they are no longer viewed as "people’s friend".. Under the circumstances creation of a discrete, independent commission like the Criminal Justice Commission may be seriously considered.
Conclusion:
The framework suggested above does involve some constitutional amendment. It is true that constitutional amendment involves a major mobilisation of public opinion, and a lot of interaction with legislators and behind the scene parleys. But given the importance of the subject matter, what is required is some good sense and commitment. This legislative activity has the potential of picking up support of both the treasury and opposition bench members.
Corruption is a problem that all countries confront. Solutions can only, however, be home-grown. What has been successfully enforced in Hong Kong and Singapore or in New South Wales in Australia may not be useful in Bangladesh. But the fact remains that fighting corruption is a business for everybody: the government, the private sector and civil society. An alliance between them is a true test of commitment.
When corruption is within limits and contained in fewer pockets a case by case treatment approach is advisable. But where corruption becomes endemic and is widespread what is required is a jolt, a major reform or a shake-up to offset the corruption equilibrium that has set in. The author is of opinion that Bureau of Anti Corruption in Bangladesh should be either dismantled and replaced by a new organization or radically revamped and reconstituted in line set out in the suggested framework. The nomenclature should preferably be changed both in letter and in spirit and may be coined as "Independent Anti-Corruption Commission of Bangladesh".
Table: Corruption Ratings for Selected Countries in Asia
| BI (1-10 scale) | TI (& (1-10 scale) | ICRG (1-10 scale) | GDP 1994 US$ | HDI Rank 1997 | |
| Singapore | 1 | 2.34 | 1.77 | 20,987 | 26 |
| Hong Kong | 3 | 3.72 | 2.17 | 22,310 | 22 |
| Japan | 2.25 | 4.43 | 2.96 | 21,581 | 8 |
| Taiwan | 4.25 | 5.98 | 4.60 | ---* | ---* |
| Malaysia | 5 | 5.99 | 5.67 | 8,887 | 60 |
| Republic of Korea | 5.25 | 6.271 | 6.20 | 10,656 | 32 |
| Thailand | 9.5 | 7.94 | 7.93 | 7,104 | 59 |
| Philippines | 6.5 | 7.95 | 7.94 | 2,681 | 98 |
| China | n.a. | 8.12 | 5.86 | 2,604 | 108 |
| India | 5.75 | 8.25 | 7.30 | 1,348 | 138 |
| Indonesia | 9.5 | 8.28 | 7.94 | 3,740 | 99 |
| Pakistan | 7 | 8.74 | n.a | 2,154 | 139 |
| Bangaldesh | 7 | 9.20 | n.a | 1,331 | 144 |
Notes:
BI Index: Business International; ICRG International Country Risk Guide; TI Index: Transparency International; GDP/Per Capita: Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (Purchasing Power Parity); HDI 1997: UNDP Human Development Index for 1997.
* This figure is not available because Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations and therefore not ranked in the Human Development Index.